ONCALL
...Family Law
......Domestic Violence
 79 Cards On This Topic:
  • ••All•• superior court records, including DV matters, are open and subject to the sealing rules unless the records fall within the confidentiality or discovery exceptions or an exempting statute or rule.
  • Direct, uncontested evidence provided by mother was more than sufficient "good cause" warranting inclusion of parties' Cs, who witnessed domestic abuse, as protected parties in DVRO.
  • D's Facebook posts claiming he had a relationship with V and fathered her child did not constitute protected speech where part of a course of conduct constituting a credible threat per PC §646.9(g).
  • Restraining order may be issued in Elder Abuse case without a capacity determination — an elder's capacity is not a general defense to abuse under the Act.
  • D's harassing and threatening public Facebook postings to and about V constituted stalking – though not sent directly to her, it was reasonably foreseeable she would become aware of them.
  • Abuse of discretion to deny DVRO renewal request where testimony of mentally ill D’s unsubstantiated reasons for her abuse and DVRO violations were given greater weight than P’s fear; DVPA broadly construed when assessing reasonableness of fear.
  • Engaging in the outright abuse of an unrepresented opposing party, Attorney could not show a good faith intention to bring suit, and cannot shield herself from liability under the guise of zealous advocacy.
  • Choking a domestic partner and thus impeding normal breathing and circulation is willfully inflicting corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition per PC §273.5(d).
  • The court’s interviewing a child outside of party's presence does not violate due process per se, but party must be informed of the substance of child’s statements so they can challenge or explain.
  • Posts on social media with personal info about mother's former girlfriend constituted substantial evidence that D's posts constituted a "course of conduct" required to issue restraining order.
  • Trial ct. erred in ruling vehicle dash cam videos captured F's "confidential communications" with Cs in violation of the Privacy Act.
  • Using intermediaries to make credible threats against V is completed stalking, not attempted stalking; the court properly declined to instruct on attempted stalking.
  • Parties no longer residing together was not a proper basis on which to deny mother a DV restraining order; oral stay-away order was not a proper substitute.
  • W&I §213.5 does not require a reasonable apprehension of future physical abuse by the party to be protected for issuance of a restraining order.
  • DVRO prohibiting possession of firearms does not violate Second Amendment if there is a finding the restrained person presents a credible threat to the physical safety of others.
  • Juvenile ct.'s jurisdictional finding, based on F engaging in DV, lacked substantial evidence where only one instance of past DV and no evidence of ongoing DV or likelihood of reoccurrence.
  • Past RO issued to protect mother and Cs was not indicative of a current DV relationship between mother and father at the time of the hearings.
  • P's RO petitions against D's identifying her in articles about her pseudonymous litigation properly stricken and D's anti-SLAPP suit granted where P failed to identify harassment and CCP §527.6 did not require D to refer to P by pseudonym.
  • Remand required to reconsider renewal of DVRO where trial court failed to exercise its discretion by applying the legal standards of Ritchie and its progeny.
  • DV petition need not list all incidents of DV if alleged abuser is on notice of the general allegations.
  • D's failure to turn over a firearm and continuing to attend P's church were both violations of the TRO and properly admitted as additional acts of abuse.
  • D's failure to turn over a firearm and continuing to attend P's church were both violations of the TRO and properly admitted as additional acts of abuse.
  • Domestic violence D forfeited by wrongdoing his right to confront V where he caused her unavailability at trial through threats and coercion; DV background of parties relevant to wrongfulness.
  • As H's DVRO petition was based in part on communications related to W's anticipated legal action and in large part on unprotected e-mails, the litigation privilege did not bar H's petition.
  • Mere fact that sexual abuse V's disclosure was not "fresh" did not render it inadmissible — any delay in disclosure went to weight, not admissibility; "fresh complaint" more aptly named "prior disclosure."
  • Unconsented-to recordings of H's verbal abuse of W were relevant and properly admitted under the exception for a DV victim seeking a DVRO.
  • When a petitioner seeks a DVRO, respondent who has already responded to the petition is not entitled to a continuance of the hearing "as a matter of course."
  • P could not sue for DV where the "friends with benefits" relationship between her and D was not a "dating relationship" within the meaning of FC §6210.
  • Although evidence supported issuance of elder abuse ROs to mother, trial ct. exceeded its authority in issuing later order declaring deed transferring property to daughter void.
  • To renew civil harassment restraining order beyond the initial five-year renewal period, party must make a showing that, after the original order issued, the restrained person engaged in new harassing conduct.
  • Firearms prohibition in son's DVRO against mother did not violate her Second and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
  • Trial ct. did not err by finding H's maintenance of life insurance policy on ex-W disturbed her peace, and was a form of abuse under the DVPA; no error in directing him to change the beneficiary to charity of her choice.
  • D's speech and acts at local political open house were constitutionally protected activities, and a reasonable listener would not have found a true threat of violence; eccentricity and being off-putting is not a criminal offense.
  • Family ct. erred in denying mother a DVRO for F's making false police reports to conduct welfare checks on Cs in her care and sending her harassing messages based on limited evidence hearing with no evidence from F.
  • Civil harassment RO against offensive opposing counsel reversed as emails were constitutionally protected activity and other annoying conduct did not cause P, an experienced FL atty, to suffer intense emotional distress.
  • "Substantial emotional distress" defined.
  • Attempts to control, regulate, and monitor a spouse's finances, economic resources, movements, and access to communications are abuse and must be considered in deciding whether a DVRO is appropriate.
  • A finding that domestic violence occurred is not a prerequisite for awarding spousal support under the DVPA.
  • FC §3044(a) presumption does not arise in proceeding for issuance of DVRO when neither party is seeking custody or a modification of a custody or visitation order.
  • Trial ct. is not obligated to proceed under CCP §533 before modifying a DVTRO to allow for exceptions consistent with visitation ordered in a parallel dissolution case.
  • Abuse of discretion to deny request for a DVRO without considering the totality of the circumstances and not taking seriously P's fear of D and his threats to kill her.
  • In denying mother's request for renewed DVRO, court erred in disregarding mother's actual, reasonable fear of future abuse by F based on present circumstances and past abuse.
  • EARO proper where P made a sufficient prima facie factual showing as to Ds' use of undue influence to have elder conservatee change his estate plan in their favor.
  • DVPA FC §6342 supported ex-H's restitution order for value of his property ex-W stole or destroyed from his house.
  • To keep the peace and afford due process during arrest on unserved DVRO, officer may enforce the DVRO after verifying it exists and orally informing the restrained person of its contents.
  • Because the family ct. did not conduct FC §6340 hearing on W's DVRO request, pro per H denied due process rights and remand for proper hearing required.
  • FC §6305 governs competing requests for ROs and expressly permits court to weigh the parties' acts to determine if one is the dominant aggressor before issuing a mutual RO; detailed factual findings not required where mutual relief not granted.
  • Role of guardian ad litem in domestic violence matters.
  • The two-year limit on most felony probations does not apply to crimes involving domestic violence.
  • The right to refuse a deposition under Marsy’s Law does not apply in a dissolution between parties simultaneously involved in a pending criminal case.
  • A finding of potential jeopardy to the safety or well-being of the children is not a necessary predicate for including them as protected parties under a DVRO.
  • A stay-away order need not specify that any violation be “willful”; that is implicit.
  • Exigent circumstances rendered the victim's communication to the stalker of the demand to cease activity impractical or unsafe.
  • A postconviction criminal protective order can only protect the actual victims of DV, not children who may have witnessed it.
  • Residential burglary based on an intent to steal theory is an act of domestic violence for which prior acts of domestic violence are admissible under Evid. Code §1109.
  • Conduct that qualifies to be enjoined by a DVRO must be dealt with by an FC §6380 DVRO; "non-CLETS" TROs are not authorized.
  • DVRO may properly protect H's girlfriend who was living with him.
  • A request for a DVRO, filed in a pending dissolution case, is a motion in that case and may be heard by the private judge.
  • By excluding evidence underlying the original restraining order, the court limited W's ability to meet her burden to show fear of future abuse.
  • The fact original DVRO was for 2 yrs. did not make evidence underlying it irrelevant to a request to renew it.
  • When allegations of DV are made, court is required to inform parties about the §3044 presumption prior to mediation.
  • Venue for civil harassment due to emails or phone calls is location from which they were sent, not where they were read.
  • Requests for mutual DVROs require court to determine the "most significant aggressor" by weighing the acts of DV against each other.
  • When a landlord uses domestic violence acts to prove a ground for an eviction, the affirmative defense applies as to that ground.
  • When deciding whether to renew a DVRO, the court properly considers previous factual findings as well as current events.
  • Compliance with a DVRO does not preclude a finding of reasonable apprehension.
  • Custodial and financial disputes may be relevant to the renewal of a DVRO.
  • Conduct which does not rise to the level of destroying the victim's mental and emotional calm does not disturb the peace within the meaning of the DVPA.
  • Nothing in the plain language of the DVPA restricts courts when ruling on a DVRO request to hearing evidence of abuse that occurred only before the request was filed.

  • Depriving a parent of access to his or her child certainly may qualify as abuse for the issuance of a DVRO.

  • The DVPA does not impose a heightened standard for specificity, nor does it contain any corroboration requirement.
  • Physical separation is not a substitute for the protections of a restraining order.
  • No error for trial court not to include children as protected parties under DVRO.
  • A girlfriend may qualify as "a person similarly situated to a spouse" for purpose of disallowing the perpetrator from carrying a firearm under federal law.
  • A DVRO which is on appeal may be renewed.
  • The County has a strong interest in maintaining all reports of suspected child abuse in CWS/CMS — even those that result in “unfounded” dispositions.
  • H’s intentionally moving into an apartment immediately adjacent to W’s constituted stalking and supported issuance of a DVRO.
  • Nature of domestic violence explained.
  • Defendant was properly subject to a protective order because a criminal threats conviction involves domestic violence.


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