CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
...Court Control of Proceedings
......Jury Instructions
.........Erroneous Instructions
50 Cards On This Topic:
  • State trial ct.’s misstatement that Pet. had pled guilty, cured belatedly by flawed instructions, violated Pet.'s state and federal constitutional rights.
  • A pinpoint jury instruction need not be given if it is argumentative, duplicative, potentially confusing, or not supported by substantial evidence
  • Murder and attempted murder convictions reversed where there was insufficient evidence to support a jury instruction on the kill zone theory; error prejudicial.
  • Trial ct.'s instructional error on the elements of robbery subject to harmless error review; error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where it did not contribute to the jury's verdict.
  • As limiting version of CALJIC No. 3.32 precluded jury from considering D's intellectual disability on charges of dissuading a witness and witness-killing special-circ., those convictions reversed; murder convictions affirmed. Death penalty affirmed.
  • Kidnap-murder special-circumstance finding set aside where jury incorrectly instructed on simple kidnapping, but correctly instructed on aggravated kidnapping, and it was impossible to determine on which theory the verdict rested.
  • Conviction of willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted murder, not expressly charged, reduced to attempted murder where jury was not properly instructed on the meaning of "willful," "deliberate," and "premeditated."
  • Harmless error to add serious bodily injury requirement to mayhem instruction where evidence strongly supported a finding that D intended to inflict a disabling injury.
  • As question of D’s sanity is entirely irrelevant at guilt phase of a bifurcated trial under PC §1026, no instruction on the conclusive presumption of sanity should be given.
  • Harmless error not to instruct that to convict D of 1st degree murder of another under the provocative act doctrine, jury had to find D ••personally•• premeditated and deliberated the attempted murder of V.
  • As jury failed to reach a verdict on torture special circumstance, judgment of death reversed; kidnapping special circumstance finding set aside because the trial ct. erroneously instructed the jury.
  • No reversible error in court's mistakes in oral instructions where jury given correctly worded written instructions and told it was governed by the instruction in its final wording.
  • Court erred in instructing on possessing "false compartment" in car where D did not add to, alter or modify vehicle's original factory equipment.
  • Harmless error to fail to instruct jury either that it had to determine that V's mother was an accomplice or that she was an accomplice as a matter of law.
  • Instructional error where finding of premeditation and deliberation as an aider and abettor special finding was based on the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
  • Error to instruct jury burden was on defendant to prove S was an accomplice where defendant was charged with sexual penetration in concert and rape in concert for sexually assaulting victim with S; error harmless.
  • Trial ct. erroneously instructed jury that defendant did not need to know he was deterring or resisting a police officer to be convicted under PC §69; error prejudicial and conviction reversed.
  • Trial ct. erred in giving design of the driveway instruction; error was prejudicial to plaintiff.
  • Jury instructions erroneous where they suggested that the jury could properly conclude that a box cutter is an inherently dangerous weapon.
  • Conviction reversed for instructional error where the jury was left confused as to whether a crime was still ongoing at the time of defendant's alleged participation in it.
  • Trial ct. erred in not sua sponte instructing the jury on simple assault as a lesser included offense of assault with a deadly weapon by an inmate where the evidence warranted the instruction.
  • MDO commitment reversed and remanded for new trial where jury instruction invited jury to consider that defendant could be released into the community unsupervised.
  • Reversal of conviction required when the trial court instructed the jury on two theories of guilt, one legally correct and one legally incorrect, and there was no basis in the record to find that the verdict was based on the legally correct theory.
  • Conviction reversed for failure to instruct jury that defendant's mere presence at crime scene was not enough to convict him of aiding and abetting assault.
  • Convictions for dissuading witnesses reversed where trial ct. failed to instruct jury as to an element of the offense.
  • Conviction reversed where jury instruction did not define an essential element of the crime, "without lawful necessity," and court erroneously told jurors this definition was in a second instruction.
  • When D is on trial for sex offenses that must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, possible error to instruct jury that it may consider D's uncharged sex offenses if they are proven by a preponderance of the evidence.
  • Conviction reversed where jury instructions for transportation for sale omitted an essential element of the offense, and the evidence supporting the missing element was not overwhelming.
  • Trial ct. committed harmless error when it failed to instruct jury on materiality requirement of Veh. Code §31 [prohibiting false statements to officers performing their duties].
  • Trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that it could consider evidence of D's mental disabilities in deciding whether he harbored the state of mind required for imperfect self-defense.
  • As substantial evidence showed D was unconscious, w/in the legal meaning of the defense, when he committed violent assault, trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the defense.
  • Trial ct. committed reversible error in failing to sua sponte instruct on the definition of "identifiable person," where it was essential to the charged crime of secretly filming an "identifiable person" under or through his/her clothing.
  • 1st degree murder conviction reversed where instructions erred in imposing uncharged conspiracy liability for 1st degree murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
  • Collective cultivation defense may apply to informal joint cultivation of marijuana between two qualified patients growing it for their own medical use; prejudicial error not to give instruction on the defense.
  • Reversible error not to make clear that a lawful marijuana cooperative can consist of patient members who grow it and patient members who pay growers with money in exchange for marijuana.
  • Reversal of felony throwing substance at a vehicle (VC 23110(b)) required where trial ct. failed to instruct on the lesser included misdemeanor offense in VC 23110(a).
  • Reversible error not to inform 2d jury of D's gross vehicular manslaughter conviction in 1st trial, leaving jury with the false impression D would be unpunished for his actions if it did not convict him of murder.
  • Insufficient evidence supported instruction on MMPA defense as D did not produce enough evidence to raise a reasonable doubt he was lawfully growing MJ for himself and other qualified patients, and not earning a profit.
  • Trial court erred prejudicially in failing to instruct on attempted voluntary manslaughter based on a sudden quarrel or heat of passion where shooting took place during heated exchange at party.
  • Harmless error not to instruct on mistake-of-fact defense as to attemping lewd act on child under 14, where some evidence justified instruction but it was not reasonably probable D would have obtained a more favorable outcome.
  • Trial court committed harmless error by instructing jury it could consider evidence of Ds' activities with other Sureños in deciding whether Ds were guilty of murdering V.
  • Reversible PC 1138 error for trial court to answer jury's question in misleading manner which failed to address the crux of the inquiry and informed the jury incorrectly on the instruction.
  • In pregnancy discrim. case, D's manager was entitled to exercise her business judgment without having to second guess—court erred in refusing this instruction and in instructing that potential hazard to a fetus is not a defense.
  • Person who has sex by impersonating someone other than a married V’s spouse is not guilty of rape of an unconscious person under PC 261(a)(4)—instruction incorrect (due to historical anomalies in law and statutory definition).
  • Although trial court erred by instructing jury that D could not be convicted of assault unless he actually knew his reckless driving would cause injury to another, instruction inured to D's benefit and error was harmless.
  • Where unconsciousness was D's primary defense to DUI, failure to instruct on unconsciousness effectively removed his principal defense from jury's consideration and was reversible error.
  • Error to give consciousness of guilt instruction and unmodified voluntary intoxication instruction that prohibited consideration of D's voluntary intoxication for anything other than whether he knew V was unconscious of oral copulation when it occurred.
  • As consent defense crucial to D's guilt or innocence of burglary, D has BofP to establish a reasonable doubt as to facts underlying the defense and court erred by instructing his burden was preponderance of the evidence.
  • Trial court erred by instructing with CACI 3704, which incorrectly instructs that the right of control alone is dispositive in determining whether a worker is an employee or an independent contractor; other factors must be considered.
  • Erroneous instruction re battery not prejudicial where it could have benefited D and in any case ample evidence supported conviction of principal offense of corporal injury to former cohabitant.