CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
...Court Control of Proceedings
......Jury Instructions
.........Generally
54 Cards On This Topic:

CALJIC No. 2.90 (Presumption of Innocence, Reasonable Doubt, Burden of Proof) passes judicial muster.

Jury instructions did not undermine and dilute the jury's duty to determine defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, nor did instructions shift the prosecution's burden of proof onto defendant.

Failure to instruct on murder with malice aforethought, lesser included offenses and applicable defenses was harmless error where the jury resolved the relevant factual disputes through its felony-murder special circumstance finding.

Where jury convicts D of lesser related offenses and deadlocks on greater offense, on retrial defense may request instruction that acquittal on greater offense will not necessarily result in D escaping all criminal liability.

Where jury convicts D of lesser related offenses and deadlocks on greater offense, on retrial the court errs if it informs the new jury of the fact of such specific convictions.

Instruct. req'g all murder Ds be "equally guilty" did not preclude finding D guilty of 2d degree murder w/out also finding co-Ds committed only 2d degree murder; felony-murder and conspiracy verdicts eliminated anything less than 1st deg. murder.

CALCRIM No. 361 applies only when D completely fails to explain or deny incriminating evidence, or claims to lack knowledge and the evidence shows D could reasonably be expected to have that knowledge.

Court need not give additional instructions, even on request, regarding victim impact evidence in addition to the standard instructions.

Cautionary instruction applies when D's out-of-court statements form the basis for criminal threat prosecution but trial court is not required to give such instruction sua sponte.

Trial ct. properly refused to instruct that a woman riding in the car used in the crimes was an accomplice as a matter of law where it was for the jury to decide whether she had the intent necessary to establish complicity.

Trial court need not instruct sua sponte on the issue of whether D appreciated the wrongfulness of his prior EC 1108 sexual misconduct at age 13-14.

Instructions trial court gave correctly and fully instructed on the requirements of the special circumstances and no additional, sua sponte instructions required.

Because a killing without malice in the commission of an inherently dangerous assaultive felony is not voluntary manslaughter, trial court could not have erred in failing to instruct jury that it was.

Where trial ct. structured and read the "acquittal-first" rule along with a special instruction on the alternative charge, jury would have understood it had the "discretion to choose the order of evaluation."

Court properly instructed on both direct and circumstantial evidence and fully apprised jury that the reasonable doubt standard applied to both forms of proof.

Even if using CALJIC 2.06 was error, no showing of judicial bias, nor that "instructions were so one-sided in favor of the prosecutor, that a fair trial within the meaning of the federal Constitution was impossible."

No error in not instructing, sua sponte, on 3d party culpability—jury could have acquitted D had it believed a 3d party was responsible, so no 3d party culpability instruction necessary.

Although written (but not the oral) instruction defining torture technically erroneous re torture-murder special circumstance, error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Instructing with CALJIC No. 2.11.5 not prejudicial error—even where it should have been modified re accomplices who testified, jury also given full set of instructions on W credibility and assessing accomplice testimony.

D violates PC §236.1(c) when D attempts, but fails, to traffic an actual minor, even if D lacks specific intent regarding victim's age. Mistake of fact as to age is not a defense to attempted human trafficking under §236.1(c) when victim is a minor.

No reasonable juror would read CALCRIM No. 850 to mean that expert testimony on intimate partner battering constitutes evidence of guilt of domestic violence or other charges.

Trial ct. did not err in failing to instruct jury on voluntary manslaughter under a heat of passion theory; even assuming error, it was harmless.

CALCRIM No. 361 may be used when a testifying defendant has failed to explain or deny matters within the scope of cross-examination, not simply those matters actually asked about on cross-examination.

CALCRIM No. 361 did not violate defendant's due process right to a fair trial by impermissibly favoring the prosecution over the defense.

Trial ct. was not required to instruct the jury on mistake of fact in connection with defendant's crime of rape in concert.

No instructional error if the court tells the jury the prosecution has to prove an element not required by law and then fails to properly define the element.

A defendant charged with murder on the theory he committed a homicide while driving under the influence is not entitled to an instruction on lesser included offenses.

Conviction for felonious taking or driving a vehicle reversed where jury did not receive instruction that vehicle must be worth more than $950, and error was prejudicial.

Trial ct. did not err when it instructed the jury that D could be convicted of resisting, obstructing or delaying a police officer if the jury found he stepped in front of an officer as he was writing a citation.

People v. Chiu was not violated where jury instructions stated each defendant must be found to have acted with premeditation and deliberation in order to be convicted of first degree murder.

Trial ct. did not err in refusing to give a voluntary intoxication instruction for a general intent crime against property.

Trial ct. committed no error in its jury instructions in disability harassment case.

Trial ct. did not err in failing to give a sua sponte instruction on lesser conspiracy offenses where the prosecution's accusatory pleading contained no overt acts supporting these offenses.

Trial ct. not required to give jury instruction on lesser included offense where a reasonable jury could not conclude that there were facts to support it.

CALCRIM No. 1520, the jury instruction for attempted arson, correctly instructs on specific intent.

No error in not giving involuntary manslaughter instructions where no question D had intent to kill but argued a form of insanity—he didn't understand he was killing mother, not a demon–such a claim must be made at sanity, not guilt, phase.

D's habeas petition granted where record did not show on which murder theory the jury relied for its verdict, and they may have focused on the natural and probable consequences theory since invalidated by Chiu.

No error in instructing D’s in-court testimony could be considered for all purposes against either D where court was ••limiting•• the use of certain types of inculpatory, but not exculpatory evidence.

Re gang killing caught on tape, trial court properly instructed the jury on the provocation doctrine as a basis for second degree murder.

Trial court did not err in failing to instruct sua sponte that an unlawful killing committed w/out malice in the course of an assaultive felony constitutes involuntary manslaughter.

Evidence D just forgot he had a hoodie when paying for other items and leaving Walmart not sufficient to support mistake of fact instruction where his act was not a mistaken belief in a set of circumstances which, if true, would have made the act lawful.

Trial court correctly instructed the jury in sexual predator case that a child under PC 288.4 is, like a minor, any person under the age of 18 years.

Trial court not required to give sua sponte instruction on imperfect self-defense where D's actual fear of imminent death or great bodily injury from rival gang members was unreasonable.

Instruction that D could be guilty of burglary if he entered an attached balcony with intent to commit theft was proper—balcony is part of an inhabited dwelling house for purposes of PC 459.

Proposed instruction on whether D's cultural background raised reasonable doubt as to his intent to inflict torture and mayhem on son during discipline was duplicative and an impermissible comment on the evidence.

Allowing jury to consider gang expert testimony as to motive and witness credibility, the optional clauses of CALCRIM No. 1403, was amply supported by the evidence.

Trial court did not err in preinstructing on direct and circumstantial evidence, without also preinstructing on method of assessing sufficiency of circumstantial evidence, where instructions given in full at conclusion of evidence.

Since jury properly instructed as to elements of charged offenses, trial ct.'s refusal to give special instruction at defense counsel's request to cure DA's misstatement of the law re element of intent was not prejudicial.

No error in giving modified CALCRIM No. 1191 instruction allowing use of charged offense re specific intent for other charged crimes where it was narrowly crafted and limited.

Reversible error to answer jury question on instruction by omitting crucial "awareness" element of charged offense.

Reversible error to instruct jury with VC 21055 [liability exemption for vehicle responding to emergency call] where instructions contradicted explicit admissions made by Ds.

Nonprejudicial error to give CACI 506, alternative method of diagnosis instruction, where no evidence the diagnostic method used was one of a number of approved methods of diagnosing a patient with child's history and symptoms.

Reversible error to refuse to instruct jury on imperfect self-defense during murder trial; question of D's belief he was in imminent peril for jury, not judge.

Jury instructions generally.