CHILDREN AND THE LAW
...Delinquency Matters
......Disposition
.........Life W/O Parole (LWOP)
43 Cards On This Topic:

Minor sentenced to LWOP; right to petition for recall and resentencing after 15 yrs.

Mandatory LWOP for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments.

M's 254-yr. sentence, based on court's belief he could not rehabilitate, violated 8th Amend. under Graham, as a juvenile nonhomicide offender must be provided some meaningful opportunity to reenter society.

Sentencing 15 yr. old murderer to life in prison without possibility of parole is not cruel and unusual punishment.

Juvenile offender sentenced to prison before mandatory youth offender parole hearings were enacted is entitled to remand to the trial ct. to make a record of youth-related factors relevant to his eventual parole hearing.

Graham required remand for resentencing of 16-year-old Ds convicted of kidnapping and rape and sentenced to 50+ years to life.

PC §1170 (d)(2) resentencing does not provide an adequate remedy for a juvenile offender unconstitutionally sentenced to LWOP, and such an offender may petition for Miller resentencing via habeas corpus.

PC §3051 and PC §4801 moot D's 8th Amend. claim of cruel and unusual punishment re his 50-yrs.-to-life sentence for murder committed when he was 16.

PC 190.5(b), properly construed, confers discretion on trial court to sentence a 16- or 17-year-old juvenile convicted of special circumstance murder to LWOP or 25 years to life, with no presumption in favor of LWOP.

Juvenile gang member's 110-to-life sentence for nonhomicide offenses constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under Graham and 8th Amend.

Trial ct. lacked jurisdiction to reconsider its prior order granting minor's writ of habeas corpus for resentencing after its decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeal.

D entitled to resentencing where his current sentence, imposed for offenses committed as a minor, was a de facto LWOP sentence that violated the Eighth Amendment under Contreras.

M's LWOP sentence reversed and remanded where record did not show that the trial ct. properly weighed Miller factors.

Prop. 57 applies to any judgment that was not final before the statute took effect.

M's 40-year-to-life sentence is not the functional equivalent of an LWOP sentence and is not in violation of Miller where he will receive a meaningful opportunity for release upon his 25th year of incarceration.

A youth offender sentenced to 28 years to life and later found suitable for release under youth offender parole provisions is not required, prior to release, to serve a consecutive sentence for a crime committed in prison after age 25.

PC §3051 supersedes PC §1170.1 with regard to youth offenders who commit in-prison crimes as adults.

U.S. Supreme Court precedent prohibiting disproportionate punishment for minors does not require use of the irresistible impulse test to determine a minor's sanity.

Juvenile offender sentenced to 40 years to life before Franklin granted remand to make a record of mitigating evidence tied to youth.

PC §3051(b)(4) mooted defendant's contention that her LWOP sentence violated Miller and the Eighth Amendment.

A youth offender sentenced to 15 years to life and later found suitable for release under youth offender parole provisions is not required, prior to release, to serve a consecutive sentence for a crime committed in prison before age 23.

M's prison sentence for a non-homicide crime that exceeds his life expectancy is a functional LWOP sentence and is unconstitutional.

M's 35-yrs.-to-life sentence "passe[d] constitutional muster" as he will be eligible for parole during his 25th year of incarceration per PC §3051 (b)(3); trial ct. to determine whether he was allowed to make a record complying with Franklin.

Where minor's controlling offense carries a sentence of 25 years to life and minor will receive a parole hearing during 25th year of incarceration, minor is entitled to make a record of mitigating evidence relevant to future parole hearing.

A juvenile offender sentenced to prison and who will be eligible for parole under PC §3051(b) must have the opportunity at sentencing to make a "record of mitigating evidence tied to youth" relevant to the offender's eventual parole hearing.

PC 3051 guarantees minor D a future parole eligibility hearing, and renders his 120-yrs.-to-life sentence constitutional, but he must have an adequate opportunity to make a record that complies with Franklin.

Following People v. Franklin, while D not entitled to resentencing, he is entitled to make a record of matters relevant at his eventual youth offender parole hearing under PC §3051 and PC §4801.

The court, not a jury, determines the sentence in a case involving a potential LWOP against a juvenile offender tried as an adult and convicted of 1st degree murder with special circumstances.

Based on People v. Franklin, SB 260 mooted Ds' 8th Amend. claim of cruel and unusual punishment re 50-yrs.-to-life sentences for murder committed as minors.

Discretionary petition to recall sentence per PC §1170(d)(2) does not compel review of the constitutionality of an LWOP sentence imposed on a D under 18 at the time of his crime.

While PC 1170(d)(2) has a procedure by which some Ds serving LWOPs for crimes committed as juveniles may obtain resentencing, it does not provide such Ds with all the rights of Miller and Montgomery and is thus not a proper remedy for Miller error.

Under Gutierrez and Miller, trial court erred in sentencing D to LWOP after excluding her evidence of rehabilitation in prison.

In imposing LWOP on minor, if court gives due consideration to youth and attendant characteristics as per Miller, it may give such weight to the relevant factors as reasonably determined appropriate under the circumstances.

Ms' LWOP sentences reversed for resentencing in consideration of Miller and Gutierrez—Ultimate question: did the crimes reflect transient immaturity or irreparable corruption.

As counsel did not raise issue of M's cruel and unusual punishment by motion or at sentencing hearing, even after Caballero filed, his performance was deficient and remand for new sentencing hearing required.

As M's sentence of 115-yrs.-to-life for nonhomicide and homicide offenses was unconstitutional, remanded for determination of parole eligibility date w/in his expected lifetime, unless his offenses reflected irreparable corruption.

Where D will be eligible for parole at 47, Miller, Graham and Caballero do not apply, as his sentence leaves possibility of a substantial life expectancy after prison, and so was not a "de facto" or "functional" LWOP.

15-yr.-old's sentence of 196 years to life must be reversed and the matter remanded for resentencing in the exercise of the court's discretion in light of Miller v. Alabama.

LWOP sentence for 1st degree murder committed when D was 17 did not violate constitutional prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment.

LWOP sentence for 1st deg. murder committed when D was 17 did not exceed the punishment allowable absent a jury determination of age and did not violate his 6th Amend. rights under Apprendi, which did not require jury finding on age.

As D was the only offender under 15 across U.S. and world to receive LWOP for nonhomicide, no-injury offense, sentence "is so freakishly rare as to constitute arbitrary and capricious punishment violating the Eighth Amendment."

Lack of court and counsels' awareness of sentencing discretion for 16-18 yr. olds, LWOP or 25-life, requires remand for resentencing in light of PC 190.3 factors and circumstances in CRC 4.421 and 4.423.

PC §190.5 not cruel and unusual punishment for teen spec. circ. murderers; requires proper exercise of discretion in imposing lesser 25 yrs. to life rather than presumptive LWOP.