PRETRIAL ADJUDICATION
...Motion to Strike
......Special Motion to Strike
.........SLAPP Statute Inapplicable
47 Cards On This Topic:

A business' confidential report to its private clients was not protected by the anti-SLAPP statute's "catch-all" provision where the information never entered, nor was intended to enter, the public sphere.

Anti-SLAPP motion properly denied where contract negotiator's lawsuit against city did not arise from city's acts in furtherance of its right to free speech in connection with a public issue.

A claim may be struck by an anti-SLAPP motion only if the speech or petitioning activity itself is the wrong complained of by plaintiff.

Where former atty became involved in a campaign to thwart former client's RE project, client's claims for breach of fiduciary duty, professional negligence, and breach of K had at least minimal merit per anti-SLAPP statute.

CSC's former decision affirming Court of Appeal's holding church property dispute was not a SLAPP suit did not mean the actions were finally decided—remand required to address remaining issues.

Property dispute between local and general church not subject to anti-SLAPP motion where actual dispute concerned property ownership rather than protected activity.

Anti-SLAPP motion properly denied where plaintiffs' suit did not arise from defendant's protected activity, but rather his alleged conduct that was illegal as a matter of law.

While insurer's alleged mishandling of plaintiff's claims was generally connected to litigation, it did not include statements made to a judicial body and was not protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute.

P's causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty and conspiracy against attorney arose not from attorney's anti-SLAPP protected litigation conduct, but his breach of professional obligations.

When a tort cause of action is asserted on a conspiracy theory, defendant’s alleged acts considered for the first prong anti-SLAPP analysis are the acts which constitute the tort itself.

Defendant's anti-SLAPP motion properly denied because statute does not apply to cause of action for breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

Anti-SLAPP motion properly denied where plaintiffs' claims were based on defendants' decision to withhold consent, not their litigation conduct or communications.

Anti-SLAPP motion properly denied where plaintiffs did not sue county in connection with statements made in connection with its evaluation of psychiatric patient, but rather county's allegedly negligent decision to release patient.

Anti-SLAPP petition was properly denied because it required a "cause of action" to be asserted and none was.

Anti-SLAPP motion properly denied where gravamen of complaint was Ds took concerted action monopolizing medical marijuana market so P's dispensary permit would expire, and any protected activity of defendants was incidental.

Anti-SLAPP motion properly denied where arbitration is not a judicial proceeding nor an official proceeding authorized by law.

State labor agencies' anti-SLAPP motion correctly denied where employer's action arose from agencies' refusal to recognize collateral estoppel effect of judgment and not their speech and petitioning activity.

A special motion to strike may not be brought in a limited civil case.

Anti-SLAPP motion properly denied where defendants' obtaining and disclosing plaintiff's confidential medical information was not protected activity.

Attorney malpractice suit was not subject to anti-SLAPP statute as it did not attack attorneys' expressive conduct, especially where it alleged misconduct that took place after attorneys' successful suit to recover fees.

Anti-SLAPP statute inapplicable to P's claims against D for reneging on property licensing agreement where claims arose from reneging and D's related communications to P were merely incidental.

Trustee's litigation activity was not protected activity under first step of anti-SLAPP analysis where beneficiaries alleged breach of fiduciary duty, and trustee's litigation activity itself was not the basis of beneficiaries' claim.

Where plaintiff's complaint contained no allegations arising from defendant's protected activity, trial ct. correctly denied defendant's anti-SLAPP motion.

Anti-SLAPP statute does not protect a governmental entity's decision to issue or deny a permit.

Pre-litigation privilege could not sustain defendant's anti-SLAPP motion where his demand letter was only a bluff designed to silence media outlets.

Alcohol distributor's suit for breach of K and declaratory relief not subject to brewer's anti-SLAPP motion where conduct challenged was termination of K and not letter communicating termination.

Because W's act of making a false police report against H was not in furtherance of her constitutional rights of petition or free speech, anti-SLAPP statute does not protect her against H's civil suit.

Denial of Ps' CCP 425.16 mtn. re breach of K claim proper where it did not arise from protected activity; mtn. properly granted as to breach of implied covenant of GF and FD where based on protected petitioning activity.

P's wiretapping and privacy invasion allegations did not "arise from" any protected activity by D on behalf of P where P was a stranger to the litigation between his wiretapped next-door neighbor and her ex-boyfriend.

Trial court properly denied Ds' CCP 425.16 motion where complaint arose from "fact" of law firm's dual representation of Ps and adversary and not from any protected litigation-related activity.

Anti-SLAPP motion properly denied where complaint did not arise from protected activity, but from a business dispute between the parties, and mention of any protected activity was merely incidental.

Student's web site message threatening another student b/c of his perceived sexual orientation was not protected by CCP 425.16 where lawsuit did not arise out of a statement made in connection with a “public issue.”

Where negotiation of settlement agreement in prior case is an act in furtherance of right to petition, D atty's anti-SLAPP motion should have been granted.

Not every mundane communication between HOA and homeowner gives rise to freedom of speech issue; CCP 425.16 (e)(4) does not come into play unless the right of free speech or the right to petition is involved.

Filing a lawsuit in a foreign country is not protected activity under U.S. or CA Constitutions so as to implicate anti-SLAPP statute.

D atty's anti-SLAPP motion invalid where he threatened to file State Bar complaint against P if P didn't sign settlement, an act of extortion.

CCP 425.16 does not protect act of initiating private, K arbitration—statute protects statements made in, or re issues under review by, a judicial or other official proceeding—private, K arbitration is neither.

Anti-SLAPP statute does not apply where protected activity is only incidental to atty conflict of interest C/A.

Where evidence at CCP 425.16 motion enables P to show probability of prevailing on defamation claim, policy concerns against amendment in this context do not apply because P's suit, likely meritorious, is not a SLAPP suit.

Special motion to strike reversed where tenant's unlawful eviction claim did not arise from protected free speech activity, but was based on D landlord's violation of rent control laws.

As even the broadest interpretation of the plain language of CCP 425.16 cannot stretch it to cover request for a subpoena, superior court erred in granting Does’ 425.16 motion and in awarding attorney’s fees.

Trial court correctly found that nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings, including the notice of foreclosure, were not constitutionally protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute.

City's action seeking declaration that Ds' proposed initiative was invalid as not a proper subject for local initiative, was not directed at protected conduct and Ds' CCP 425.16 motion should not have been granted.

CCP 425.16 does not apply to Ps' C/As against attorney for breach of K, professional negligence and breach of fiduciary duty.

Terminating a tenancy or removing a property from the rental market are not activities taken in furtherance of the constitutional rights of petition or free speech for CCP 425.16 purposes.

SLAPP statute does not apply where it is the prayer for an injunction, not a cause of action, which arises from an act in furtherance of a person's right of petition or free speech.

Error to grant special mtn to strike where C/As based on allegations about manner in which private RE transactions conducted, and governmental permit app's were only incidental to principal purposes of the transactions.