PRETRIAL ADJUDICATION
...Motion to Strike
......Special Motion to Strike
.........Atty Fees
27 Cards On This Topic:

A defendant that successfully moves to strike a plaintiff’s cause of action under the CCP §425.16 anti-SLAPP statute, on merits or non-merits grounds, is entitled to attorney's fees and costs.

Ds who do not file anti-SLAPP motion before Ps' voluntary dismissal may not recover attorney fees and costs per CCP 425.16 (c).

Award of attorneys fees to petitioners upon RPIs' unsuccessful anti-SLAPP motion reversed where a reasonable attorney could conclude: (1) Ps asserted claims against RPIs and (2) Ps' claims arose from RPIs' protected conduct.

The federal Cartwright Act, which only allows an award of attorneys fees to a plaintiff, does not prevent a defendant from collecting attorneys fees upon a successful anti-SLAPP motion.

Where wife's appeal of her anti-SLAPP motion denial raised colorable issues, wife's appeal was not frivolous and respondent was not entitled to attorney's fees.

Prevailing defendants on an anti-SLAPP motion entitled to attorneys fees; prevailing plaintiff not entitled to fees because motion was not frivolous or intended to cause delay.

D entitled to atty fees and costs as prevailing anti-SLAPP party, but trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding a reduced amount.

Because the Supreme Court in Ketchum v. Moses determined that fees incurred in enforcing an anti-SLAPP attorney fee award are recoverable costs under CCP 685.040, trial court and Court of Appeal were bound by it.

Special motion to strike properly denied where complaint asked for declaration of parties' respective rights to atty fees, but did not seek to prevent Ds from exercising their right to assert their lien.

That atty was not paid like a regular "employee" of law firm may make him an independent contractor for tax purposes, but does not make him separate counsel for firm for purposes of atty fees under CCP 425.16.

Attorneys sued for failing to pay for court reporting services, who attempted to transform this collections case into an anti-SLAPP action, are sanctioned for bringing a frivolous appeal.

Ps who lost SLAPP suit against City on the merits not entitled to atty. fees under private atty. general statute; City entitled to fees as CCP 425.16(c) is not an unconstitutional infringement of right of petition in cases against govt.

Attys’ special motion to strike complaint properly denied as untimely; Ps not entitled to atty fees—fact that special motion to strike was untimely cannot support finding that it was frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay.

Where underlying judgment void as to party's atty because CCP 425.16 does not authorize atty fees award against party's atty, she may challenge judgment in contempt proceeding.

Order granting Atty's motion for attorney fees affirmed where P failed to show abuse of discretion in awarding mandatory fees under section CCP 425.16(c).

Because Haneline failed to develop an argument that Ds’ anti-SLAPP motion was "frivolous" or "intended to cause unnecessary delay," it was not entitled to atty fees as prevailing P.

A party, whether or not he is an attorney, who is not represented by counsel and who litigates an anti-SLAPP motion on his own behalf, may not recover attorney fees under the statute.

Severe reduction in atty fees on motion to strike justified where atty leavened fee request with noncompensable hours and vague, indecipherable billing statements, destroying its credibility.

Ps challenge to order granting Google's anti-SLAPP motion untimely and not cognizable on appeal from judgment; trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding $23,000 as reasonable attorney fees and costs to Google.

D law firm incurred no atty fees in bringing its motion to strike as work done by its own attys, but D atty, appearing on own behalf, entitled to fees for retained outside counsel, "to be sorted out by the trial court."

Trial court properly denied Ds attorney's fees under CCP 425.16 where P dismissed her claims against Ds before they filed motion to strike—they were not "prevailing defendants" on the motion.

Attys' fees to Ds properly denied after their special motion to strike was sustained as to only one of many causes of action.

Court properly granted motion to strike and awarded fees and costs despite P filing amended cross-complaint under CCP 472.

Trial court had jurisdiction to reconsider an initial order denying cross-defendants' attorney fee motion under CCP 425.16.

As prevailing party, D entitled to recover atty fees reasonably incurred in defending against Planned Parenthood's appeal from order granting D's anti-SLAPP motion and atty fees, even though appeal voluntarily dismissed.

Trial court has jurisdiction to award atty fees to prevailing D whose SLAPP motion was not heard solely because it was dismissed before Ds obtained ruling on the SLAPP motion.

Nothing in language of CCP §425.16 requires that proof be provided of the amount of fees and costs incurred at same time of filing of special motion to strike.