CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
...Destruction/Failure to Disclose Evid.
......By Prosecution
.........Failure to Disclose
 55 Cards On This Topic:
  • DA’s failure to disclose Brady material evidence violated D’s DP rights as State’s evidence resembled a house of cards, built on the dubious testimony of its prime W, corroborated by the similarly suspect testimony of its 2d W.
  • Although DA should have disclosed exculpatory documents casting doubts on reliability of detailed W testimony, D failed to show prejudice or materiality under Brady.
  • No Brady error in nondisclosure of polygraph exams where exams not evidence and no reasonable probability disclosure would have resulted in different trial outcome.
  • Good faith or bad faith of DA not determinative; due process requires DA upon request to turn over material evidence favorable to accused.
  • Habeas granted where DA's suppression of part of a deal with key W, that he wouldn't have a competency test until after he testified, violated Brady with respect to D's conviction for the 1st degree murder.
  • DA's suppression of probation report showing prime W against D had pled guilty to robbery, was on probation, and had been a rival gang member amounted to Brady violation necessitating new trial.
  • Where scent evidence was all that linked D to getaway car, and corroborated very weak eyewitness IDs, DA's failure to disclose the police dog had a history of mistaken scent IDs violated Brady v. Maryland.
  • Mother on death row for 22 years based on testimony of officer with a long history of lying under oath and other misconduct, about which court and jury were not informed, is entitled to habeas relief; state to provide all of O's personnel records.
  • Dist. court properly denied homicide inspectors' SJ motion in 42 USC 1983 case of withholding exculpatory evidence and presenting perjured testimony in Ps' murder trial—inspectors had no absolute or qualified immunity.
  • Brady imposes a duty on police officers as well as prosecutors to disclose exculpatory evidence, and Ps did not have to establish bad faith.
  • Govt committed Brady violation by withholding from defense evidence that a woman who looked like D robbed banks in same area while D was in custody.
  • As state supreme court failed to consider cumulative effect of evidence supposedly suppressed by DA, its decision contrary to clearly established federal precedent.
  • Reversible Brady error for gov. to withhold exculpatory evidence re informant/witness; new trial necessary.
  • Prosecution must determine whether govt. failed to disclose all material evidence which could have been used to impeach arresting officer.
  • No Brady error where delayed disclosure did not prevent defense counsel from effectively preparing and presenting Ds' case.
  • Where DA never called potential W to testify, there was no testimony to impeach with claimed undisclosed criminal information about her, and D's Brady claim failed.
  • No Brady violation where D did not show reasonable probability of a different result had criminalist's notes and unprinted film, of which DA unaware, been timely produced.
  • D granted relief from death sentence where DA withheld favorable and material mitigation evidence at penalty phase that supported D's having committed the murders because of death threats from a Colombian drug cartel.
  • No Brady violation where D's statement was very unfavorable to the defense and did not fall within scope of Brady; as W testified to the statement, it was not suppressed, whether or not it was disclosed during discovery.
  • Failure to disclose pending criminal matters facing DA's witness not a Brady violation where the evidence was not material.
  • No Brady violation where detective's expert opinion that D's car, which was alleged to have collided with V's just before the murder, had body work done on it.
  • Habeas relief granted and death sentence vacated where DA withheld vital information and witnesses at penalty phase in violation of Brady v. Maryland.
  • Brady and its progeny do not require disclosure of information before the prosecution actually or constructively possesses it.
  • Investigator's report undermining informant's credibility, given to defense day after guilt verdict, did not violate D's rights where he failed to establish materiality under Brady.
  • No judicial error or professional incompetence involving criminalist's late-discovered shoe print testimony and exhibits admitted against D.
  • No due process violation in not preserving V's car from which forensic test results were obtained, where D did not claim tests incomplete or deficient, only that car could have been subjected to further testing.
  • DA’s knowledge of W arrested re charged murder not undisclosed to D where factual finding that defense had been told of W1’s arrest before he testified was supported by evidence.
  • Belated disclosure of witness interview tapes not error where most of them did not testify and D could not show prejudice.
  • D failed to establish exculpatory evidence allegedly withheld by DA was material under Brady v. Maryland.
  • No violation in failure to disclose alleged "get out of jail free" deal where info would have been ••favorable•• to D as impeaching W's credibility, but ••not material•• as it would not have added to cumulative impact of other impeach. evidence.
  • DA not required to present nonexculpatory memoranda expressing DAs’ doubts about expert witness’ testimony in this and other cases.
  • D didn't establish DA had material exculpatory evidence it failed to disclose re alleged jail informant system that encouraged inmates to make up or seek confessions from notorious Ds.
  • No error in DA's failing to disclose certain discovery items where D didn't show sufficient cause, they weren't material or exculpatory or they were outweighed by privilege.
  • DA's failure to disclose material exculpatory evidence, that RIA blood test showed D positive for PCP at time of crimes, requires vacating judgment.
  • As nothing in record showed late discovered hair was material or favorable, D did not establish that delay or DA misconduct in handling hair was prejudicial.
  • DA has affirmative duty to disclose substantial material evidence favorable to accused.
  • Company that provided police crime lab with DNA-identifying software program was not a member of the prosecution team and therefore prosecution could not be compelled to produce discovery solely in company's possession.
  • If prosecution notifies defendant it possesses Brady material, it may be had if defendant informs the court that he was so notified, and offers an explanation of how it might be relevant to the case.
  • Conviction reversed under Brady where prosecution failed to disclose police digital in-car video of defendant's confession; no need for defendant to first request video.
  • Law firm's involvement with DA as a cooperating witness in an embezzlement case did not support a finding that law firm's files were under DA's control for purposes of exculpatory disclosure requirements.
  • D's Brady motion properly denied—there was no violation because the evidence of O's unrelated misconduct, although egregious, was immaterial to D's guilt and did not undermine confidence in the verdict.
  • Ps charged with embezzlement were substantially prejudiced by LA DA's failure to provide docs to show they complied with city policy when they sought $75 per diem payments for expenses in NY on city business; DA w/held exculpatory evidence.
  • Although due process required DA to disclose, prior to prelim. hrg., evidence he had that was favorable to the defense and material to probable cause, photos here were not favorable to the defense and motion to dismiss information properly denied.
  • Molestation charges properly dismissed under Brady where DA did not disclose evidence before prelim. that V had made similar, unfounded, accusations in the past.
  • Nondisclosure by DA of SART video of V's medical exam constituted prejudicial Brady error, warranting new trial.
  • As evidence DA failed to disclose to Ds, that they supported or sympathized with the Taliban, was not favorable to them, there was no Brady violation and trial court erred in dismissing case.
  • Substantial prejudice from DA's inaccurate disclosure of some exculpatory evidence and failure to disclose other exculpatory evidence required dismissal of murder indictment.
  • DA's suppression of material, exculpatory eyewitness tapes at trial constituted Brady violation and now-deceased petitioner would have been entitled to new trial; habeas granted.
  • Reversal and new trial required where DA withheld material evidence from defense and there was reasonable probability trial result would have been different if the suppressed documents had been disclosed.
  • DA violated D's due process rights by failing to disclose material evidence re prior felonies by pivotal prosecution W.
  • Writ of habeas corpus properly granted where withholding of material, inculpatory evidence re key prosecution witness met Brady test.
  • DA's failure to disclose exculpatory evidence reflecting on credibility of material Ws, incl. inducements made to Ws for favorable testimony, merits new trial.
  • Reversal required where DA failed to produce, and court then suppressed, potentially exculpatory tape relevant to D's demeanor and intoxication.
  • Mutual discovery statutes and duty to disclose evidence.
  • Prosecution's failure to disclose.


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