CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
...Hearsay Exceptions re Statements
......Admissions (Crim.)
.........Limitation: Voluntariness
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State must prove voluntariness of confession by preponderance of evidence.

Habeas relief for M proper where evidence showed Miranda warnings were inadequate and relentless overnight questioning by tag team of Os overbore his will and rendered his confession involuntary.

Minor's confession inadmissible as police didn't allow him access to attorney on request and courts failed to consider corroborative testimony of lawyer.

Cannot use post-Miranda statements where Os set out deliberately to violate D’s Miranda rights and evidence obtained in violation thereof used to prove D’s guilt, though admitted for impeachment.

Ten plus hours of taped interrogation did not amount to coercion under the totality of the circumstances where D was provided with food, drinks, breaks and the chance to speak with his wife and lawyer.

Confession not involuntary where D confessed to shooting Vs not because his will was overborne, but because he was capable of making, and made, the rational choice to offer his side of events.

D's interview stmts admitting his sexual intent and conduct in connection with the murder, and confessing to the prior attempted rape of V were not coerced and were voluntary.

Voluntariness of D’s Miranda waiver not affected by O's action possibly implying that the case against D was already strong.

D's police interview statement not involuntary as not induced by promise of witness protection placement where police did no more than point out a possible benefit that might accrue from his "truthful and honest course of conduct."

O's suggesting that D deeply consider his crimes for 48 hrs. did not amount to continuing interrogation after D invoked right to counsel.

D's statement concerning his dream of a dead woman not involuntary where statement was not causally related alleged promises of leniency as a 3d officer elicited D's statement after the interrogating Os broke off the questioning.

Stmts D made in parked patrol car, in patrol car en route to sheriff's and in station interview room properly admitted where reasonable person in D's circumstances would have believed he was not under arrest and was free to leave.

No error in admitting D's stmts from 4 interviews where Os' vigorous interrogation, display of confidence in D's guilt, and use of more sympathetic and less sympathetic interrogators did not render stmts involuntary.

Os' statements that the V had been "hurt" as opposed to killed did not prejudicially mislead D so as to render his statements involuntary, unknowing, or unintelligent.

D's several confessions a week apart were not involuntary and violated neither Miranda nor Edwards.

Under totality of circs, D's confession freely and voluntarily given and Os did not use D's wife as leverage to coerce him into confessing.

For purposes of voluntariness, D's 2d taped statement was sufficiently attenuated from that part of his first statement that was found involuntary and excludable (which portion itself came ••after•• D had already confessed).

D's confession not involuntary where his own vulnerability did not demonstrate official coercion.

D's confession to homicide not coerced by threats or false promises, but given freely and voluntarily.

Under totality of circumstances, D's confession was product of her free will.

D's statements not involuntary where record amply reflects his personal willingness, if not desire, to discuss his crimes.

Totality of circumstances attending D's postarrest statement did not support his claim that it was the involuntary product of police coercion.

D's statements after surrender properly introduced where Miranda waiver was voluntary, knowing and intelligent.

Ample evidence D's decision to confess murder was not the product of coercive tactics by Os, but was based upon his free will and preexisting belief that when questioned by authorities, you should tell what you know.

No evidence to support D's claim he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive Miranda rights before speaking with psychiatrist, or that his statements were involuntary because of improper coercion.

No need for Miranda warnings before phone conversation between D and his father recorded where Os did not compel or coerce D to talk to his father.

No Miranda violation in ruling D's statements to CA detectives while jailed in MO needn't be suppressed and could be used for impeachment where no evidence statements involuntary.

D failed to show confession involuntary b/c of mental impairment, being misled about time to obtain counsel, failure to readminister Miranda, sham police test was coercive, or interview tape had a gap.

Trial court did not err in allowing D to be impeached with statements he made to detective after he refused to waive his Miranda rights.

Although, officers' repeated refusal to honor D's invocation of his Miranda rights did not induce an involuntary statement, this "should not be construed as condoning the officers' tactics."

D's statements to Detective not involuntary under totality of the circumstances, including questioning after he invoked right to counsel, threat of arrest, and experiences in native Guatemala.

Despite no Miranda warnings, D's statements to Os, which did not discuss crime, were not involuntary or incriminating and did not taint Mirandized statements made later in week.

Court properly allowed DA to impeach Ds with postarrest statements voluntarily made with no police coercion; fruits of those statements therefore also properly admitted.

Under totality of circumstances, D's tape-recorded confession was voluntary: evidence contradicted D's testimony he was under influence of cocaine and that O threatened to kill him.

Detectives' mention of possible death penalty and suggestions D would benefit from giving truthful, mitigated version of crimes were not implied threats and promises of leniency sufficient to render admissions involuntary.

In light of circumstances — deliberate Miranda violation; D's youth, inexperience, low IQ; isolated overnight confinement; and O's promise & threat—D's initiation of further contact with O, and his 2 confessions, were involuntary.

D's confessions to three murders voluntary and not tainted by Miranda violation where his intervening independent act of asking for detectives, broke any possible causal link with earlier suppressed confession.

D's statements to police, made at home two days after his release from custody, properly admitted—D had ample time, opportunity, and incentive to consult counsel outside coercive atmosphere of custody.

Substantial evidence supported decision that, despite D's youth, educational level and maturity, his statements after Miranda waiver were voluntary, and no improper promises of leniency.

Substantial evidence supported D's receipt of Miranda warnings and voluntariness of his confession.

Plea bargain agreement not coercive where one-time co-D required to testify truthfully at D's trial but nothing else said about testimonial content.

D’s indication that he wanted attorney but would talk to officers until he thought he needed one was not an invocation of the right to counsel requiring cessation of interrogation.

Under totality of circumstances, Os not required to readvise M of Miranda rights in later interrogation by investigator which was reasonably contemporaneous with M’s initial knowing and intelligent waiver.

D not intimidated into making confession where O never made express promises or refused him protective custody without statement.

"The truth is going to set you free" exhortation during interrogation, though not approved, not error where D had waived rights to silence and counsel and was speaking freely.

Although D did not ••expressly•• waive Miranda rights, express waiver not required where his actions made clear that waiver intended.

When officer during custodial interrogation deliberately fails to honor suspect's request for counsel, to get evidence for impeachment purposes, statements may be used to impeach.

Although O did promise leniency, his comments not the motivating cause of D's admissions, which, in totality of circumstances, voluntarily made.

Cal. standard same as federal: preponderance of evidence.

Defendant's confession erroneously admitted into evidence where police placed him in an atmosphere equivalent to formal arrest and questioned him without giving a Miranda warning.

Trial ct. correct in admitting LAPD officer/murder suspect's taped police interview where she was under no compulsion or coercion and POBRA imposed no requirement to answer detectives' questions.

Os' implicit promises of leniency for D's pregnant co-D did not coerce him to confess—b/c of his sophistication and experience with the system, he knew such promises were hollow and they had no authority to fulfill them.

Fact that police make misrepresentations does not necessarily render an otherwise voluntary confession inadmissible.

D's admissions after he was given a fake polygraph and was told it showed he was lying when he denied involvement in the crime, were not involuntary so as to preclude their admission in evidence.

No error in refusing to give D's special instruction re coercion where instructions given adequately advised jury to consider circumstances surrounding D's confession and, in any case, no coercion evident.

Ds were "in custody" in cell but not "interrogated" for Miranda purposes when they freely made incriminating stmts to each other: No compulsion when suspect speaks freely to someone he thinks is a fellow cellmate.

As question D asked during police interview re talking to attorney was equivocal, his statements made at later interview were properly admitted as evidence against him.

Standard of proof for determining voluntariness of juvenile's confession is preponderance of evidence.

Confession not inadmissible solely because accused is of subnormal intelligence.

Voluntariness of confession determined by totality of circumstances surrounding confession.

Determination of voluntariness and admissibility of confession are preliminary facts to be determined by trial court.