CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
...Character and Reputation Evidence
......To Prove Conduct & Prior Bad Acts
.........Domestic Violence Evidence
 32 Cards On This Topic:
  • Evidence of prior incidents of domestic violence, child or elder abuse, admissible as character evidence, subject to Evid. Code §352.
  • Evidence of domestic violence D inflicted on wife and former wife well w/in scope of PC 190.3, factor (b); proper weighing of such was for jury and neither state law nor constit'l error committed in admitting it.
  • No abuse of discretion in allowing uncharged acts of domestic and other violence where they showed escalating campaign to retaliate against D’s estranged wife and family for marital breakup.
  • "Duress" as used in PC §288 (b)(1) includes threat of hardship; 1993 amendments to rape & spousal rape statutes deleting 'hardship' from definition of 'duress' in rape and spousal rape did not alter such judicial definition.
  • Defendant's uncharged prior acts of DV against victim properly admitted to prove crimes against victim's mother where D threatened her at gunpoint in victim's presence.
  • Evidence of acts of DV against victim that were more than ten years old properly admitted at trial in the interest of justice.
  • Defendant's prior acts of domestic violence properly admitted under EC §1109.
  • In attempting to establish his innocence, D cannot use Evid. Code §1109 to introduce evidence of a third party's propensity for DV.
  • Given the weakness of evidence of premeditation and deliberation in 1st degree murder case, there was a reasonable probability the improper admission of vivid and inflammatory evidence of D's past DV conduct affected verdict, which was reversed.
  • Trial ct. properly admitted D's prior acts of DV against V and other girlfriends under section 1109, as murder is the ultimate form of domestic violence.
  • Stalking is an act of domestic violence w/in the meaning of EC 1109 as defined by FC 6211, and admissible to prove propensity to commit the crime of making criminal threats.
  • Evidence of D's prior act of DV can be considered as propensity evidence when D accused of "an offense involving" DV, which here included burglary—as D entered V's house to commit DV, his burglary "involv[ed]" DV.
  • No abuse of discretion in finding evidence of D's prior DV episodes was not substantially more prejudicial than probative under EC 352 and EC 1109(a) and admissible in "interest of justice."
  • Allowing evidence of D's prior spousal battery convictions under EC 1109 does not violate constitutional prohibition against ex post facto application of laws.
  • CALCRIM 852 instruction on uncharged domestic violence does not violate due process or mislead jury as to burden of proof.
  • Because D lived with baby, prosecution not only for "child abuse," so that prior acts of child abuse admissible under EC 1109(a)(3), but also for "domestic violence," and prior acts of DV admissible under EC 1109(a)(1).
  • EC §1109 (a)(2), which authorizes admission of evidence of prior bad acts in elder abuse cases does not violate due process.
  • Court did not err in allowing evidence of D's prior uncharged domestic violence incident where it was germane to his self-defense claim and very similar to charged DV charge.
  • No material difference between CALJIC No. 2.50.02 and CALCRIM No. 852 re considering evidence of uncharged acts of domestic violence—No. 852 did not violate D's due process rights.
  • Admitting prior acts of DV under EC 1109 not due process violation-admission of propensity evidence not unfair so long as trial court required to apply EC 352 balancing.
  • Testimony of D's former girlfriends re domestic violence was highly relevant and probative as it created a strong inference D had a propensity to commit the similar acts V described.
  • Sufficient evidence supported Husband's conviction for stalking ex-Wife.
  • Substantial evidence supported predicate finding D and domestic violence V had a "dating relationship" within meaning of EC 1109.
  • Substantial evidence supported predicate finding D had engaged in domestic violence against V by pointing gun at him, causing fear.
  • Court did not err in admitting evidence of D's prior act of domestic violence under EC 1109.
  • Evidence showed D and V were cohabitants for purposes of corporal injury statute—that they had no permanent home and sometimes lived separately with relatives did not preclude finding they were cohabitants.
  • D failed to prove Evid. Code §1109 unconstitut'l under due process, now a settled issue, or equal protection; court sufficiently articulated Evid. Code §352 reasoning.
  • Evidence of 1992 incident of domestic violence properly admitted at D's trial for murder of W under Evid. Code §1109 subject to limitations of Evid. Code §352.
  • No abuse of discretion in admitting past act evidence in domestic assault where found highly probative under Evid. Code §1109 and court carefully exercised balancing test.
  • Instructions didn't allow jury to infer D committed charged crime solely from proof of prior domestic violence acts; message consistent beyond reasonable doubt proper standard.
  • Evid. Code §1109, which admits other acts of domestic violence, is constitutional.
  • Evid. Code §1109, which allows evidence of D's prior domestic violence in prosecution for offense involving domestic violence, does not violate D's right to due process.


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