CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
...Court Control of Proceedings
......Shackling, Other Security
 21 Cards On This Topic:
  • Trial ct.'s denial of defendant's request to wear his wedding ring in the courtroom did not violate his state and federal constitutional right to be tried in civilian attire.
  • Even if the trial court said use of the stun belt was "appropriate," rather than "necessary," court did not use a lower standard as the record as a whole established the manifest need standard was met.
  • No abuse of discretion in ruling the use of a stun belt was appropriate where court addressed D's fear the device would be accidentally activated, a risk identified later in Mar.
  • No abuse of discretion in using physical restraints during D's transit through the public hallways of the San Bernardino courthouse without any particularized showing of need.
  • Trial ct. acted within its discretion in ordering Ds to wear either shackles or stun belts where record reflected a manifest need to physically restrain Ds.
  • No abuse of discretion in ordering D be restrained with a REACT electronic stun belt at trial where D posed a safety risk based on violent incidents in jail and his studying the bailiffs' guns—finding of manifest need adequately supported.
  • Harmless error under CA law for two judges to require D to wear REACT stun belt in courtroom during both guilt and penalty phases.
  • Although issue waived, there would have been no error in D's having to wear an electric shock belt during trial where jurors did not see it.
  • Absent any indication that the jury was aware of D's physical restraints, or a request from D for an instruction, trial court did not err by failing to instruct with CALJIC No. 1.04.
  • Placing uniformed, armed bailiff behind D while he testified was harmless error under Watson; court should have determined on a case-specific decision whether such heightened security was appropriate.
  • Any error in compelling D to wear a stun belt at hearing and failing to make manifest need finding was not prejudicial where D did not claim stun belt affected him or his demeanor while testifying.
  • Error, if any, in using leg restraints on D at trial was harmless where no evidence any juror observed the restraints.
  • No error for Ds to wear leg brace restraint for a day during voir dire where jurors couldn't see the brace, and it was not unduly restrictive; even if error for court to "defer" to deputies in permitting the brace's use, error harmless.
  • No abuse of discretion in ordering D to wear REACT electronic security belt during trial where court expressly made a record of facts re D's violence and D could have chosen traditional alternative restraints.
  • Stationing courtroom deputy next to testifying D is not an inherently prejudicial practice that must be justified by a showing of manifest need—it is not akin to "human shackling."
  • Harmless error to shackle D during voir dire without showing of manifest necessity where shackles not visible to jury.
  • No error in not ordering D's leg restraints removed where he was sitting at counsel table and the restraints could not be seen.
  • Trial court properly exercised its discretion in securing the courtroom by placing deputy next to disruptive D during testimony—shackling distinguished.
  • Assuming under Hernandez that D's rights violated by deputy accompanying him to and from the stand and standing/sitting behind him as he testified, error harmless under Watson standard.
  • Prejudicial error to shackle D's legs at trial over objection where no showing of manifest need made and jury saw the unjustified shackling.
  • Handcuffed D was entitled to Miranda warnings before questioning—as DA used D’s custodial statements to impeach him, he was entitled to CALJIC No. 2.13.1 instruction to consider statements only re credibility.


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