ONCALL
...Children and the Law
......Dependency Petitions
312 Cards On This Topic:

Cases current up to 12/31/2023.

Agency's failure to fulfill its duty of initial inquiry as to ICWA ancestry was reversible error where members of C's extended family were available and contacted, yet there was no attempt to ask them about his ancestry.

For dependency jurisdiction to exist due to substance abuse, said abuse does not require a diagnosis by a medical professional or satisfaction of the criteria for a substance use disorder.

Evidence did not support ICWA due diligence findings re Cs' adult relatives, in- or out-of-state, where insufficient contact attempted and relatives did not receive the required notice.

No UCCJEA violation in terminating mother's parental rights w/out consulting NV court, which had previously relinquished jurisdiction.

No abuse of discretion in placing C with "mere" biological F, over presumed F's objection, where court properly considered all relevant criteria in determining placement was in C's best interest.

Duty to inquire of extended family members as to C's possible Indian heritage applies when removal is made via a section 340 protective custody warrant.

By not appealing jurisdiction termination order, including visitation and custody orders, F forfeited any challenge to those rulings, and forfeited his appeal of earlier orders.

Child taken into protective custody by warrant under W&IC §340(a) or (b) falls within the ambit of W&IC §306(a)(1), and the ICWA inquiry mandated under W&IC §224.2(b) applies.

Following Delila D., the duty to make ICWA inquiry of "extended family members" applies even if the children here were not taken into "temporary custody" per W&IC §306.

W&IC §224.2(b)'s expanded duty of initial inquiry did not apply where C taken into protective custody per warrant, not placed in temporary custody.

Failure to properly notify PAP of Cs' emergency removals meant period for filing objections and requesting a hearing did not commence; thus, her objections were timely filed.

Mother could not use her appeal from her ••post-permanency•• W&IC §388 petition to challenge legal guardianship order and ICWA findings made at the W&IC §366.26 hearing a year earlier.

In bypassing services, court properly examined mother's minimal effort to address her drug addiction in the 20 years since half sibling was also removed and reunification services terminated.

There is only one duty of initial inquiry as to Indian ancestry, encompassing available extended family members no matter how C is initially removed from home.

Substantial evidence showed jurisdiction over child living in deplorable conditions was proper based on factors other than indigence alone, and there were no reasonable means to protect her from risk of harm other than removal from father's custody.

Even if issue not forfeited, siblings' adoptive parents did not qualify as "relatives" for consideration under W&IC §361.3 relative placement preference.

ICWA initial inquiry adequate where court interviewed relatives from both sides of two generations of C's family, and every person the interviewees identified.

ICWA's Indian placement preferences do not violate Congress' Article I authority as its power to legislate re Indians is plenary, and includes state custody proceedings.

Error to deny F an evidentiary hearing on his W&IC §388 petition during COVID-19 pandemic, where F was incarcerated in 3 prisons, had different attys who had problems contacting him, and prison officials did not respond to emails and voicemails.

Reversal required where order removing C from F's custody and orders requiring him to engage in substance abuse testing and treatment were not supported by substantial evidence.

7-yr.-old's consistent and compelling statements that she wished to be adopted amply showed the parental benefit exception did not apply and termination of mother's parental rights would not be detrimental.

The expanded duty of initial inquiry as to Indian heritage under W&IC §224.2(b) does not apply where Cs taken into protective custody pursuant to a warrant.

As NREFM had no standing to challenge C's placement order, she had no standing to challenge the denial of W&IC §388 petition.

HSA satisfied its duty of initial inquiry where parents declared they had no indigenous ancestry, confirmed by relatives on both sides; HSA not required to interview five other extended family members.

As grandparents were approved as a resource family, no adoption home study or further approval as adoptive parents was required for them to adopt their grandchild.

Forfeiture doctrine did not bar mother's challenge to the juvenile ct.'s compliance with the UCCJEA in termination of parental rights case.

Forfeiture doctrine did not bar mother's challenge to the juvenile ct.'s compliance with the UCCJEA in termination of parental rights case.

Conditional reversal required for DCFS to ask three extended paternal family members for whom it had contact details the ••vital•• information whether C may have Indian ancestry.

Where DPSS took C into protective custody per warrant, not under W&IC §306, it had no obligation to ask C's extended family members about his potential Indian status under W&IC §224.2(b).

Error to order additional reunification services to mother beyond 24 mos. from date Cs were originally removed—Cs' return to mother's custody at disposition hrg. did not toll the maximum time period for services.

Court erred in ordering additional reunification services to mother beyond 24 mos. from date Cs were originally removed.

Further extension of services not required even if reasonable services were not provided during the 12- to18-mo. extension; must consider C's interests as to whether the delay to permanent placement is warranted.

Excluding mother's recordings of visits with C did not violate her DP right where she was able to present evidence, cross-examine adversarial witnesses, and had opportunity to argue issue's merits.

After TX ceded emergency temporary jurisdiction, CA juvenile ct. retained exclusive, continuing SMJ, unless CA cedes jurisdiction back to TX; there is no concurrent jurisdiction.

No abuse of discretion in ordering COVID-19 vaccination for 12-yr.-old dependent in group home and denying mother's W&IC §388 petition based on her religious objections.

No error in assessing best interests of Cs when making custodial exit orders or granting sole physical custody to mother; father failed to show conditions existed to justify ongoing jurisdiction.

Amended W&IC §300(b)(2)(B) had no relevance where the lack of appropriate custody orders was only one of many factors, including mother's DV history, which placed C at risk of harm per section 300(b).

As tribe has exclusive authority to determine membership eligibility and Tribe found Cs were not eligible, substantial evidence supported findings that Cs were not Indian children and ICWA did not apply.

CFS failed to fulfill duty of initial inquiry as it made no effort to question extended adoptive family members as to C's status as an Indian child; W&IC §224.2's duty of inquiry not limited to biological relatives.

DCFS did not exercise due diligence in attempts to locate F or ask about Indian heritage despite having contact with C's maternal family members and information about residence of paternal GF.

Dependent C should have been placed with F where HSSD did not establish by ••clear and convincing evidence•• that such placement would be detrimental to C under W&IC §361.2(a).

Ordering drug testing in F's reunification plan was abuse of discretion where no evidence he had any substance abuse issues.

Abuse of discretion to grant sole physical custody to mother without an express finding that it would be in Cs' best interests—exit order must serve the best interests of Cs, not penalize F for failing to comply with the case plan.

Juvenile court's finding returning younger C to mother's custody did not undermine earlier findings re mother's relationship with older C and justify termination of parental rights to older C.

Juvenile ct. erred when it failed to order a supplemental bonding study after receiving a nonresponsive evaluation from appointed expert.

Juvenile ct. erred when it relied upon E's unresponsive report to determine that the beneficial parental relationship exception to the termination of parental rights did not apply.

Although F's appeal of neglect finding was moot, Court of Appeal had discretion to review the case if necessary to protect the child and preserve the family unit.

Court cannot bypass reunification without making necessary findings on the record under W&IC §361(b)(6) and §361.5(k).

Substantial evidence supported finding that Mother's history of drug use and a relapse posed a risk of detriment to C's well-being in current, stable foster family.

Substantial evidence supported verdict where jury found SWs deliberately or with reckless disregard fabricated or misrepresented evidence against mother and omitted exculpatory evidence; materiality is an issue for the jury.

Juvenile court violated mother's due process rights when it established jurisdiction based on unpleaded allegations of emotional abuse by mother, whom DHHS never alleged was an offending parent.

SSA did not show removal of C from PAP, to live with out-of-state relatives she did not know, was in C's best interest.

Failure to inquire of extended family members as to C's Indian child status was harmless error where there was no indication in record they had information likely to bear meaningfully upon the question.

Conditional reversal and remand required where juvenile ct. failed to satisfy requirements of ICWA by not inquiring of C's caregiver/PAP and extended family members as to C's possible Indian heritage.

Where both paternal GM and great-GM were available, DPSS failed in its ICWA inquiry duty by not asking them if they had Indian ancestry and whether C was or might be an Indian child.

Jurisdictional findings of neglect vacated and petition dismissed where no substantial evidence C's subdural hematomas were caused by abuse or neglect by mother or anyone in mother's household.

ICWA inquiry insufficient where it failed to conduct further inquiry from relatives, and document responses or findings; postjudgment evidence denied as no "••exceptional circumstances••."

Juvenile court erred in finding ICWA inapplicable by accepting Mother's statements alone and not inquiring of Father and extended family members as to possible ICWA application.

Reversal required where DHS located many relatives, and was in contact with GPs, but either only inquired of parents as to C's Indian heritage, or failed to document other responses.

Juvenile court erred in terminating alleged F's parental rights by failing to afford him proper notice of proceedings and his rights, thus violating both statutory and due process rights, resulting in a process that was fundamentally unfair.

Conditional reversal required where neither SSA nor juvenile court investigated F's information on his LinkedIn contact with his mother re C's Indian heritage.

Judgment freeing minor for adoption conditionally reversed and remanded where investigation incomplete and court made neither express nor implied ICWA findings.

Appeal dismissed as moot where DCFS already investigating ICWA issues, and Court of Appeal not in a position to micromanage the process.

Error to find ICWA did not apply where record did not establish the court's expanded duty of initial inquiry was satisfied.

Though court can exclude evidence as sanction for violating order to exchange witness lists, exclusion of sole witness petitioner's testimony, for not having been on list, was abuse of discretion.

As father could not show Agency's failure to perform duty of initial inquiry as to Indian heritage was prejudicial, reversal of order terminating his parental rights not required.

Routine practice of converting contested jurisdictional confirmation hearing into an uncontested jurisdictional hearing, without notice to mother, denied her due process rights.

DHHS complied with its duties of further inquiry after termination by interviewing F's mother, who affirmed that all of family's native heritage was Mexican, and thus C was not an Indian child.

Juvenile court must consider ICWA evidence in the first instance, not postjudgment, to determine whether DPSS discharged its inquiry duties under ICWA.

Postjudgment evidence on whether ICWA applied should be considered where it could have the beneficial consequence of expediting proceedings, thus promoting adoption.

Though CFS failed to discharge its duty of initial inquiry, ICWA inquiry and notice errors do not warrant reversal of findings and orders other than the finding that ICWA does not apply.

Conditional reversal of termination of absent mother's parental rights required where DCFS violated her DP right to notice of proceedings; F had standing to assert violation on her behalf.

When juvenile ct. applies wrong legal standard in rejecting the beneficial relationship exception, no reversal where M did not introduce evidence permitting a finding in her favor under correct legal standard. Reliance on improper factors harmless error.

Juvenile court did not err in determining Mother failed to carry her burden of proving that reunification services would be likely to prevent reabuse of infant son where she would not admit to the initial, observed abuse.

It is not viable to reunify C with parents in El Salvador b/c he would face a substantial risk of serious physical harm as a result of their inability to adequately protect him from gang violence. Probate ct. applied incorrect legal framework.

As long as C’s decl. and other evid. establish facts supporting SIJ predicate findings by a preponderance of the evidence, ct. must issue the findings; if C’s decl. establishes a supporting fact, they may be issued w/out further evid. of that fact.

When social services agency accepts its obligation to satisfy inquiry reqs under ICWA, reversal of early dependency order is not warranted simply b/c parent has shown the ongoing obligations not yet satisfied as of the time parent appealed.

ICWA error is reviewed under a hybrid substantial evidence/abuse of discretion standard, and termination orders should only be reversed if the error was prejudicial.

Failure to make adequate inquiry is harmless where child is to be adopted by maternal grandmother.

Whether the failure to conduct ICWA inquiry was harmless depends on whether the record affirmatively reflects the protections intended to be afforded through the exercise of that duty have been provided.

Failure to maintain frequent visitation can preclude a claim of parental benefit exception.

A bonding study is not a prerequisite to terminating parental rights.

Where parents deny Indian heritage and it is unlikely further inquiry would be meaningful, failure to conduct adequate inquiry is harmless.

Mother’s actions may have been extremely negligent, but since she didn’t actually injure child, she should not be denied reunification services.

Where there is no evidence of Indian heritage, failure to make findings is harmless, but remand is appropriate to make required findings.

A state official who interferes with a parent's lawful custody through judicial deception violates the constitutional right to familial association and is not entitled to qualified immunity.

There is no automatic right to a contested review hearing in legal guardianship cases.

Fourth ICWA Inquiry Test: failure to conduct ICWA inquiry is harmless unless record contains information suggesting a reason to believe the children may be Indian children.

Postjudgment ICWA inquiries do not moot the failure of the Agency to do an adequate heritage investigation.

The court improperly focused on disabled parents’ inability to assume parental roles of disabled child as a determining factor in deciding whether child would be harmed if the relationship were terminated.

When DCFS conducts adequate ICWA investigation during appellate process, the appeal may be dismissed as previous failure then becomes harmless.

ICWA duty to inquire does not extend to children’s great-grandparents.

ICWA requires an adequate investigation of a family member’s belief a child may have Indian ancestry so as to ensure a tribe entitled to ICWA notice will receive it.

Where parent denies Indian heritage and refuses to provide information on extended family, ICWA not violated if family members not contacted.

There is no specific constitutional right to privacy of juvenile court records.

For a GAL to be appointed, there must be evidence the parent is mentally incompetent.

Failure to require presence or appoint counsel for an incarcerated parent for a combined jurisdiction and disposition hearing is not structural error requiring reversal per se.

Focus of a permanency planning proceeding.

Child must remain in parental custody pending resolution of dependency proceedings, ••despite the problems that led the court to take jurisdiction over the child••, unless court is clearly convinced that such disposition would harm the child.

A subjective belief that a parent has not internalized lessons from the events that led to dependency does not constitute C&CE children can not be safely returned to that parent.

Before ordering removal of Cs, the Court must consider removing offending parent from home.

Before removing a child from a parent’s custody, the juvenile court must determine whether the child will be in substantial danger if permitted to remain in the parent’s physical custody.

The duty of further inquiry was triggered when the social worker had reason to believe child was an Indian child; duties discussed.

The practice of “splitting” jurisdiction and/or disposition hearings as to mother and father is unauthorized and erroneous.

Any complaints regarding the failure to continue hearings or secure F's presence should have been raised in an appeal from the disposition hearing.

Disposition hearing may not be continued beyond 60 days in absence of extraordinary circumstances, and never beyond 6 months.

When the Department fails to discharge its duty of inquiry under ICWA, in most circumstances, the error is prejudicial and reversible.

The failure to conduct the ICWA inquiry in each case constitutes a miscarriage of justice.

CFS does not discharge their duty of further inquiry until they make a "meaningful effort" to locate and interview extended family members and to contact BIA and the tribes.

Error to remove C from his de facto parents and place with relatives who were strangers with no evidence removal was necessary or in the child’s best interest.

In most circumstances, information in possession of extended relatives is likely to be meaningful in determining whether the child is an Indian child.

Where evidence of Indian heritage is likely readily obtainable, failure to inquire beyond parents is prejudicial.

A section 388 petition is the appropriate method for raising a due process challenge based on lack of notice.

A child's best interests do not outweigh a parent's right to adequate notice so as to actively participate in dependency proceedings.

Failure to inquire about Indian heritage from extended family members not reversible absent showing a more favorable result would have been reached.

When it is unlikely any further inquiry of family members will yield information about Indian ancestry, failure to inquire is harmless.

Dept. has a duty of inquiry into Indian heritage which goes beyond merely asking parents.

The juvenile court considered improper factors when ruling the parental-benefit exception did not apply.

A foster parent who provided care for a child for two years qualified as a de facto parent, and that right was not extinguished by child's placement with others.

Failure to comply with W&IC §391 requires reversal of termination of nonminor dependency.

Caden C. does not prohibit the court from determining the negative impact of F's unresolved issues on C were antithetical to the kind of beneficial parental relationship required by W&IC §366.26.

No error in setting a combined 6- and 12-month review hearing.

After 18-mo. reunification period expires, a parent may file a section 388 request for additional time if circumstances have changed and doing so would be in C's best interest.

The court is not required to make express findings when it concludes parental rights termination would not be detrimental to the child.

Balancing potential benefits to child from adoptive placement is proper factor to consider when weighing detriment.

Failure to satisfy visitation requirement negates parental-benefit exception to termination.

Mother's failure to introduce a bonding study in a termination of parental rights hearing permitted an inference neither child had a significant, positive emotional attachment to her.

Father's death did not moot the appeal where doing so would leave the children in legal limbo.

The court erred in denying Mother's motion to set aside the jurisdictional findings once she provided sufficient evidence of a valid medical excuse for her nonappearance.

Term "parental role” is ambiguous; necessary determination is whether children have a substantial, positive, emotional attachment to parents.

Court cannot consider previous social worker’s reports which were not offered into evidence at the section 366.26 hearing.

A superior court "shall" issue an order containing Special Immigrant Juvenile (SIJ) findings if there is evidence to support them.

Child's turning 18 does not moot an appeal from erroneous jurisdictional findings which could subject the parent to inclusion in CACI.

Jurisdiction must be based on the circumstances before the court at the time of the hearing, not stale events which are unlikely to recur.

Cannot base jurisdiction on a parent's being uncooperative with social worker.

Failure to appeal termination of juv. ct. jurisdiction did not render appeal from denial of DVRO moot.

DCFS' inability to locate Father did not excuse it from the responsibility of ascertaining whether there was reason to believe C was an Indian child.

The failure to properly consider whether the parental bond exception to termination applied required reversal.

Where record did not show Father received adequate notice of proceedings and a required report was not prepared, exit orders reversed.

Where record did not show Father received adequate notice of proceedings and a required report was not prepared, exit orders reversed.

Failure to investigate readily obtainable information tending to shed meaningful light on whether a child is an Indian child requires reversal.

Issue at jurisdiction hearing is not whether a significant risk of physical injury existed in the past, but whether the earlier threatening conduct will recur.

DCFS failed to satisfy its duty to inquire whether Cs might be Indian children because it did not make meaningful efforts to locate M’s biological parents, who were “extended family members,” as defined by ICWA.

Authority to set a section 366.26 hearing is not conditioned on a reasonable services finding.

Since C had no home state, CA had jurisdiction based on significant connections.

To deny placement with a nonoffending noncustodial parent, the court must find by C&CE placement would be detrimental to the health, safety, and/or well-being of the children.

The proper role of social workers in dependency proceedings.

Termination reversed where unclear if the parental-benefit exception applied.

Court may not consider the possibility of post-adoption contact in determining whether to terminate parental rights.

The appointment of a GAL is not a tool to restrain a problematic parent, even one who unreasonably interferes with the orderly proceedings of the court or who persistently acts against her own interests or those of her child.

The court did not abuse its discretion by denying Mother’s section 388 petition where she failed to show material changed circumstances.

Amending the dependency petition to conform to proof at the jurisdictional hearing deprived parent of due process.

A guardianship may be terminated by a §388 proceeding without first filing a §387 petition.

Court must examine the nature of the parent-child relationship before the dependency proceeding and contact during the dependency proceeding, to evaluate whether a significant positive emotional attachment exists.

A parent asserting failure to inquire must show—at a minimum—that, if asked, he or she would, in good faith, have claimed some kind of Indian ancestry.

A de facto parent has no standing to appeal a custody decision because they cannot show how their legal rights were injuriously affected.

When a parent's counsel unequivocally denies Indian heritage in her presence, the court is not required to disregard counsel’s representations and directly question Mother.

A parent need not show progress in addressing issues such as drug abuse that led to the child’s dependency in order to establish the Parent-Benefit exception to termination.

Explanation of the Selection and Implementation Hearing process.

Father was entitled to an evidentiary hearing as to whether the Agency ignored the most likely means of finding him and thereby denied him due process.

Courts should be wary of removing children from their mother's custody because she has been the victim of domestic violence.

Jurisdiction should be based on children's current, not past, circumstances.

The very specific evidence of Indian ancestry present provided reason to believe the children were Indian children and triggered a further duty of inquiry.

ICWA does not apply when a child is removed from one parent and placed with the other.

Parent needs to appeal from the order terminating dependency to raise issues relating to original exercise of dependency jurisdiction.

Where parental rights have been terminated and the parent promptly directs their attorney to appeal, the court can grant relief where the attorney fails to do so timely.

Removal order may not be based solely on Father’s incarceration and criminal record.

When child is placed with the previously custodial parent, the other parent is not entitled to reunification services.

Removal order may not be based solely on Father’s incarceration and criminal record.

When F shows he did not receive notice of the dependency petition and the jurisdiction and disposition hearings due to the lack of diligence, a separate showing of best interest is not required.

An ancestry.com DNA test indicating "Native American" heritage, without more, does not provide "reason to believe" a child may be eligible for membership in an Indian tribe.

If visitation is inconsistent with the well-being of the child, or would be detrimental to the child, the juvenile court has the discretion to deny such contact.

Court did not abuse its discretion by ordering conjoint counseling with mother and C when deemed appropriate by C's therapist.

Removal order reversed where there was no evidence suggesting danger to C if the DV between parents continued—no danger resulting from C being in F's care.

The court acted within its discretion to deny a request for drug testing where there were no allegations connecting drug use to the alleged DV incident.

Returning the children to mother’s custody when she was involved in an ongoing abusive relationship posed a risk of substantial danger to them.

Where the Dept. seeks to change or modify a prior order placing a dependent child with a relative, it must proceed under section 387 rather than section 385.

To be found a current substance abuser, it is not necessary to be diagnosed by a medical professional or fall within one of the specific DSM-IV-TR categories.

The court need not wait for disaster to strike before asserting jurisdiction.

A court is entitled to infer past conduct will continue where the parent denies there is a problem.

An adequate investigation of a family member’s belief a child may have Indian ancestry is essential to ensuring a tribe entitled to ICWA notice will receive it.

"Mere biological father" has standing to raise issues of ICWA compliance on appeal.

Denial of counsel at jurisdiction/disposition hearing affects parent's Due Process.

Failure to permit incarcerated parent to participate in dependency proceedings affects Due Process, but does not mandate reversal if error is harmless.

Where parent’s failure to reunify with child was due solely to poverty, and terminating reunification services for father was not in child’s best interests, court must permit additional time to find housing.

W&IC §366.26(i) prohibits collateral attacks on dependency orders freeing a child for adoption and placing the child with a caregiver pending an adoption.

Juvenile court orders after termination of dependency that are not contained in an "exit order" have no continuing effect.

May not terminate Father's parental rights when there are no allegations against him other than his poverty and Department failed to provide adequate services.

Failure to notify a parent of the requirement to file an extraordinary writ as a prerequisite to taking an appeal from a termination order provides good cause for allowing the appeal.

W&IC §385 permits a court to sua sponte reconsider a prior order denying presumed parent status.

Where a dependency petition has been filed, the juvenile court is vested with exclusive responsibility for determining the identity of presumed parents.

Family court and juvenile court serve different purposes.

If DCFS' further inquiry did not result in a reason to know the children were Indian children, ICWA does not apply and there was no obligation to give formal notice to the tribes and to file that notice with the court.

Filing a section 388 petition to terminate dependency jurisdiction under section 390 is entirely proper.

In ordering a permanent plan for an Indian child subject to ICWA, the juvenile court is not restricted to ordering the permanent plan that the child’s tribe selects.

At the selection and implementation hearing, the permanent plan preferred by the Legislature is adoption.

Failure to provide an alleged father required statutory notice of how to elevate his status not harmless error.

Social workers violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when they sexually harass private individuals while providing them social service.

Failure to accept responsibility and remorse for domestic violence is properly considered in making a disposition order removing child from parent.

Conservatorship of O.B.'s "clear and convincing" evidence holding applies broadly, including in dependency cases.

Dept.'s opinion Mother's lack of insight created a substantial risk of harm to C was properly considered, but insufficient alone to support a finding of detriment.

UCCJEA is a mandatory rule, but does not regulate a California trial court’s fundamental jurisdiction and can be forfeited by a failure to raise the issue.

A court properly may decline placement with a safe and nonoffending parent if that placement would be detrimental to the child’s emotional well-being.

While a child's wishes are not dispositive on placement, they are relevant.

Mother demonstrated significant changed circumstances to justify modifying order scheduling a §366.26 hearing.

Juvenile court properly separated siblings.

Nature of domestic violence explained.

Juvenile court has jurisdiction to order vaccinations over parents’ objections and to invalidate a medical exemption letter.

The court had no authority to continue a section 364 review hearing beyond the time permitted by the emergency Covid-19 orders.

Failure to give notice harmless where it was not reasonably possible that with proper notice the result would have been different.

Only a presumed, not a mere biological, father is a "parent" entitled to receive reunification services, and only a presumed father is entitled to custody of his child.

F's offer of proof was sufficiently specific, setting forth the observations about which the witness would testify such that he was entitled to present it at a contested hearing.

W&IC §388 petition is not required to change custody at a periodic review hearing.

Section 387 does not limit the court’s authority to enter a custody and visitation order at termination based on the children’s best interests.

There is no requirement for a showing of substantial risk of harm to Cs when the court issues a custody order upon the termination of jurisdiction pursuant to section 364.

Without visitation, reunification services are virtually assured to be unsuccessful.

The juvenile court may not set a section 366.26 hearing unless it finds by clear and convincing evidence the parent was provided reasonable reunification services.

Courts have discretion to extend 18-month reunification period where a timely challenge to the adequacy of reunification services is made.

Appeal properly dismissed where detention order based upon W&IC §342 petition is interlocutory and not appealable.

Mother's W&IC Code §388 petition improperly denied where she established a substantial change in circumstances by resolving domestic violence issues and showing modification was in child's best interests.

Dependency jurisdiction does not require that a child is neglected, but only requires a substantial risk child will suffer.

Appellate disentitlement should not be used to punish parents who do not fully cooperate with the social services agency during the investigation leading up to dependency jurisdiction.

C's dependency case could be dismissed without a dual status committee report where dependency case was at a late stage, probation dept. implicitly concurred with social service agency, and dependency issues were sufficiently addressed.

Parents' argument that W&IC §366.26 report's "adoptive family assessment" was missing required information forfeited when they failed to make that objection in juvenile ct.

Where Cs were likely to be adopted by a foster parent preliminarily assessed as a prospective adoptive parent under section 366.26, parents' unsubstantiated arguments that foster parent was unsuitable failed.

Where father's appellate brief failed to raise any arguments concerning juvenile ct.'s order terminating his visitation rights, his appeal was deemed abandoned.

W&IC §300(c) jurisdiction over C correctly premised upon father's violence, verbal abuse, racism, impulsiveness and lack of insight.

Substantial evidence did not support a finding that, in order to protect his daughter, father needed to participate in a parenting course.

Agency's dependency case plan for Mother violated W&IC §16501.1(g)(2) where "follow all recommendations" language prospectively included services without explaining how they were appropriate to accomplish plan goals; error harmless.

Substantial evidence supported removal of children.

CA juvenile ct. had subject matter jurisdiction over Cs under the UCCJEA where Cs had lived in CA at least six consecutive months before dependency proceedings commenced.

No further ICWA inquiry was necessary because Mother's statement children may have Indian ancestry by itself was insufficient to support a reason to believe children had such ancestry.

Dependency petitions erroneously sustained upon parent's substance abuse where there was no evidence children faced substantial risk of harm from that abuse.

Mother's appeal of jurisdictional finding not moot where social services agency might pursue dependency jurisdiction in similar cases where there was no evidence of substance abuse or substantial risk to children.

Removal order upheld where father's possession of child pornography created a great risk of harm to child, although the likelihood of physical abuse was small.

Reunification bypass provision applies to parents who actively resist court-ordered drug treatment programs, not those who relapse while attempting sobriety.

Detention and jurisdiction hearing orders reversed where court failed to appoint counsel for incarcerated father.

Agency's further inquiry under ICWA was adequate.

Disposition order conditionally reversed, and case remanded, where Agency sought continued foster care placement for Cs and did not comply with ICWA notification at least 10 days before hearing.

Order terminating services and setting W&IC §366.26 hearing vacated where finding of detriment to children was unsupported by substantial evidence.

Every effort should be made to avoid continuances in juvenile dependency cases.

Order terminating parental rights upheld where agency complied with ICWA inquiry and notice requirements and was not required to "cast about" for further leads.

Grandmother improperly denied de facto parent status where juvenile ct. identified no factual basis for its decision.

W&IC §387 petition improperly granted where juvenile ct. failed to follow mandatory adjudication procedures.

While grandmother's appeal did not seek return of children to her custody, it was not moot since findings of physical abuse had ongoing consequences for her.

At selection and implementation hearing, guardianship may be selected without first determining the child is likely to be adopted; selecting guardianship was not an abuse of discretion.

Juvenile ct. erred when it failed to state facts supporting its decision to remove child from Mother's custody.

Juvenile ct. reasonably exercised its discretion to order services for Mother based on record evidence of her behavior.

Juvenile ct. reasonably exercised its discretion to provide monitored visitation of child by Mother where unmonitored visits could place him at risk.

Error to terminate parental rights where social services agency failed to give incarcerated father proper notice of jurisdiction and disposition hearing.

Special immigrant juvenile findings must show that a child is a dependent under both state law and federal law.

W&IC §300(f), which grants juvenile ct. jurisdiction based upon the parent or guardian causing the death of another child through abuse or neglect, does not also require the surviving children to be at current risk of substantial harm.

Juvenile ct. failed to determine whether C should be placed with his non-custodial parent under W&IC §361.2.

Mother's failure to take a writ from a nonappealable dispositional order forfeited her challenge to that order where the juvenile ct. properly advised her of the writ petition requirement.

Error to deny Mother reunif. services and terminate her parental rights based upon a finding her whereabouts were unknown when she provided agency with her address, and agency engaged Mexican authorities and mailed her notices.

Juvenile ct. erred when it dismissed petition for lack of sufficient evidence of current risk when the lack was because Mother absconded with her children and prevented agency from monitoring their welfare.

W&IC §361.5(b)(10) reunification services bypass provision may apply to the same child that was subject to a termination of services in a previous dependency proceeding.

Juvenile ct. judgment reversed where Agency did not exercise due diligence in notifying father, a resident of Mexico, of proceedings, and failed to follow the Hague Convention.

The specificity of father's notice of appeal prevented Court of Appeal from liberally construing it to encompass a trial ct. order unspecified in notice.

CCP §1021.5 prevailing party's attorneys fees are not available in a dependency proceeding.

Juvenile ct.'s overriding the bypass of reunification services for parents unsupported by substantial evidence.

Order terminating parental rights conditionally reversed due to county's and trial ct.'s ICWA notice errors.

The rebuttable presumption in FC §3044 against awarding sole or joint custody of a child to certain perpetrators of domestic violence does not apply to dependency proceedings.

Juvenile ct.'s finding of W&IC §300(b)(1) jurisdiction reversed where no substantial evidence showed that C was at substantial risk of serious physical harm from legal guardian's methamphetamine use.

Juvenile ct. correctly ordered visitation between a nonparent and a child where a bond existed and visitation was in the child's best interest.

Juvenile ct.'s disposition order overturned where it did not allow Mother to present witnesses for failure to file a joint trial statement; local rule requiring statement invalid due to improper adoption.

Restraining order properly issued against father where there was a finding he severely sexually abused child.

Juvenile court's reliance on the beneficial relationship exception to the termination of parental rights was an abuse of discretion where C suffered as a result of Mother's unresolved substance abuse and mental health issues.

Because CA juvenile ct. had continuing, exclusive jurisdiction under the UCCJEA, Mother's appeal of CA juv. ct. orders not moot where CA court had dismissed dependency jurisdiction and C was now under jurisdiction of LA juvenile ct.

Upon request, a dependent child's counsel is entitled to receive a copy of a child's agency case file, including any RFA-related information, pursuant to W&IC §317(f) and §827; balancing test required.

Dependency jurisdiction over C was proper based on Mother’s use of cocaine and her reckless driving conviction sustained shortly before the dependency proceedings.

Informal supervision was not appropriate where Mother gave conflicting stories about her substance abuse and had not enrolled in a drug program.

W&IC §387 petitions properly sustained.

Cs subject to W&IC §387 petitions properly removed from Mother under W&IC §361.

Dependency jurisdiction properly terminated where minor could not show undisputed facts that the juvenile ct. erred as a matter of law.

While Mother's appeal from court's finding at gun surrender hearing was timely, she could not use it to challenge the sufficiency of an ICWA notice because the order was not premised on any ICWA finding.

Where F did not receive reasonable reunification services, juvenile ct. could extend services six months beyond the 18-month review period.

The juvenile court was not required to proceed under W&IC §352 to extend services on a no reasonable services finding.

Mother had no standing to appeal child's placement order where her reunification services were terminated.

A tribal customary adoption order can be modified after it has been given full faith and credit by the juvenile court, and full faith and credit may be given to the new order.

Jurisdiction and dispositional findings reversed where there was insufficient evidence at the time of the hearing that C was at substantial risk of suffering serious physical harm or illness.

While court did not advise Mother of her right to challenge jurisdictional and dispositional orders by writ, this did not confer standing to appeal where the record showed she had actual notice of her right.

Court of Appeal disapproves of the use of a habeas writ to challenge juvenile ct.'s order regarding child's placement.

Court erred in not finding the beneficial relationship exception to termination of parental rights applied where children benefitted from Mother's presence.

Failure of juvenile ct. to find that any risk of harm to Cs was serious or substantial required reversal of jurisdictional and dispositional order.

W&IC §361.3 giving preferential consideration to a relative seeking placement does not apply to relatives seeking placement of a child in continued foster care pursuant to W&IC §366.26(b)(7).

Juvenile ct. cannot adjudicate jurisdictional allegations against father based on facts and law not alleged in W&IC §300 petition.

Juvenile ct. violates parent's right to due process when it adjudicates jurisdictional allegations against parent based on facts and law not alleged in W&IC §300 petition.

Children properly included in three-year RO issued against father under W&IC §213.5 where his DV against mother with children present disturbed children's peace; physical violence against children unnecessary to sustain order.

Where NV court declined to exercise jurisdiction over children finding CA was the more appropriate forum, CA court had subject matter jurisdiction over dependency case; declination of jurisdiction upheld without findings.

Under ICWA, agency had an affirmative duty to interview Cs' paternal great-grandmother once Father alerted agency that she might have information regarding family's Indian heritage.

Parents' due process rights not violated where they were afforded a sufficient opportunity to be heard by Indian tribe before it finalized customary adoption order.

The reunification services bypass provision in W&IC §361.5(b)(3) does not require that the child removed from parent's custody suffer physical or sexual abuse, such abuse to the child's sibling suffices.

Disentitlement doctrine barred Mother's appeal of a grant of reunification services; Mother's appeal heard on the merits nonetheless.

Where juvenile ct. reasonably inferred that Mother was evading social services agency, reunification services bypass provision at W&IC §361.5(b)(1) did not apply.

Order terminating parental rights conditionally reversed where social services agency knew child may have Cherokee heritage but did not notify tribe, and where agency failed to fully investigate child's paternal lineal ancestry.

Mother's failure to appeal an earlier juvenile ct. order finding "good" ICWA notice was given did not preclude her from raising this issue in an appeal from a subsequent order.

Compliance with ICWA unnecessary where minor was placed with his presumed father upon a dispositional hearing.

Order terminating parental rights reversed where agency did not provide complete and accurate ICWA notice of personal identifying information about direct lineal ancestors of child, specifically great-great-grandfather.

Juvenile ct. properly terminated dependency jurisdiction over C where W&IC §366.3(a) provides that whether to continue jurisdiction is generally in the court's discretion.

At review hearing, juvenile ct. abused its discretion in not granting C's counsel a continuance where good cause was present.

Juvenile ct. may retain dependency jurisdiction when a nonminor dependent is placed in a supervised independent living placement with a former foster mother.

Juvenile ct. properly considered the statutory factors in W&IC §300(j) in removing C from parents' custody.

Disability is not a bar to adoptability; continuing parent-child relationship did not outweigh permanency and stability of adoptive placement.

In terminating the parental rights of Indian parents, court did not err in not considering whether legal custody was likely to result in serious damage to the child, in addition to considering physical custody.

In terminating the parental rights of Indian parents, juvenile ct. record contained substantial evidence to support the ICWA detriment finding.

Juvenile ct. did not err when it determined the beneficial parent-child exception to the termination of parental rights did not apply.

It is not the role of the juvenile ct. to sua sponte come up with a solution to a child’s refusal to visit a parent under a visitation order.

W&IC §300(g) dependency jurisdiction exists if any of the four separate criteria for jurisdiction in the section exists.

In an Allen M. hearing, a juvenile ct. must consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether dismissal of a dependency petition promotes a child's welfare.

Dependency jurisdiction can be resumed for a nonminor under the Welf. & Inst. Code only when such jurisdiction was established by dispositional order before the nonminor's 18th birthday.