ONCALL
...
Children and the Law
......Delinquency Matters
160 Cards On This Topic:
Cases current up to 12/31/2023.
Despite M's progress in RISE, juvenile ct. had the authority to deny his request for a reduction of his baseline term of confinement at his first six-month review hearing.
In refusing to grant D's petition to seal documents not addressed in an earlier petition, juvenile court misconstrued W&IC §781.
Under W&IC §782, juvenile ct. may dismiss any part of petition against ward without dismissing the whole.
UHSD had a duty to preserve video re school sex assault because litigation was reasonably foreseeable when video was erased, and UHSD not shielded by safe-harbor provision of CCP §2023.030(f).
Juvenile court erred in not taking into account autistic/ADHD D's best interests when considering whether to terminate transition jurisdiction.
Remand for W&IC §720 error required where record did not show the juvenile ct. was aware of, and exercised its discretion as to each wobbler alleged against minor.
When M is accused of serious offenses, section 709 does not bar the court from ordering secure confinement beyond the one-year remediation period for conclusion of competency proceedings.
New W&IC §707 applied retroactively and required reversal of M's transfer order to criminal court; analysis of the five criteria at new compliance hearing should focus on amenability to rehabilitation.
Although Assembly Bill 2361 applied retroactively to M's case, he did not show that remand for the juvenile ct. to reconsider its decision to transfer M to criminal ct. under the amended law would be appropriate.
DA entitled to new fitness hearing per amended W&IC §707 so court can determine, considering all factors, whether M is amenable to rehabilitation before transfer to criminal court.
DEJ order based on offense committed when petitioner was a minor but a W&IC §602 petition not filed until he was 26 vacated as he was beyond the jurisdiction of the court.
As M's case became final when his right to appeal from the dispositional order was exhausted, ameliorative changes to W&IC §731 did not apply retroactively to his case.
M's probation condition not to engage in unconsented sexual touching is not void for vagueness as a reasonable person would interpret it to proscribe unconsented sexual touching of another, due to the parts of the body involved or M's intent.
Duty to preserve evidence arises when party to be sanctioned was objectively aware that future litigation was reasonably foreseeable, i.e., was probable or likely to arise from an incident.
To find M who brought BB gun to school a "continuing danger" for expulsion purposes, District should have considered all relevant facts, including evidence of M's general character; witness intimidation finding flawed.
Probation order authorizing PO to offer ward community service option to work off alleged probation violations did not improperly delegate judicial functions to the PO nor deprive M of judicial process due him.
Where dismissal statutes disagree, mandatory language of W&IC §1179 prevails and juv. petition must be dismissed after M completed probation and was granted honorable discharge by DJJ
Minor committed to Pathways not required to register as sex offender as it is not subject to mandatory reg. reqs.; only juveniles discharged/paroled from DJJ are subject to such registration.
25-yr.-old sentenced to LWOP entitled to youth offender parole hearing to same degree as youthful offenders who received sentences of 25 years to life for similar crimes.
Denying juvenile offenders sentenced to the functional equivalent of LWOP the opportunity to petition for resentencing violates equal protection right.
PC §29820's prohibition against firearms for certain juvenile offenders applied to M who committed offense enumerated in PC §29850—a PC §243.4 felony sexual battery.
Court was permitted to correct Minor’s period of maximum DJJ confinement nunc pro tunc.
Minor is entitled to credit for all time in custody prior to his transfer to DJJ.
Conditional reversal and remand is appropriate where a minor became eligible for informal supervision after a finding of wardship.
When a minor is committed to DJJ, a juvenile court must apply the minor's precommitment credits against the maximum custodial term.
The juvenile court has exclusive authority to order release of a deceased child's juvenile records regardless of whether a dependency petition has been filed and a prior jurisdictional finding has been made.
Prop. 57 applies during resentencing when a criminal court sentence imposed on a juvenile offender before the initiative’s passage has since been vacated.
W&IC §730.6 does not prohibit a restitution hearing at a date after sentencing.
D, who was under 25 when the crime committed, but is ineligible for YOPH due to Three Strikes, is still entitled to a Franklin proceeding to present mitigation evidence in anticipation of a future parole hearing.
W&IC §801 amendment permitting direct appeals of orders transferring a minor from the juvenile court to a court of criminal jurisdiction is not retroactive.
The crime of possession of child pornography is a “wobbler” requiring juvenile courts to declare it either a felony or a misdemeanor.
Less culpability should attach to a crime committed by a juvenile than to a comparable crime committed by an adult.
Where a juvenile court’s order includes a maximum confinement term for a minor who is not removed from parental custody, the remedy is to strike the term.
Juvenile court had discretion under W&IC §782 to dismiss the prior petitions in the interests of justice so it could commit minor to DJJ.
Minor may not be ordered to pay for DUI class which court imposed as a condition of probation.
Warrantless search provision for a first-time misdemeanor offender was within trial court's discretion.
A Franklin proceeding is intended to ••preserve•• evidence relevant to youth-related factors, and young offenders should have the right to present it.
Permanent incorrigibility is not an eligibility criterion for juvenile LWOP.
Rap lyrics properly admitted as evidence of “mental state,” not for their literal truth.
P’s “previous delinquent history” included a crime he committed after the one for which he had been charged.
The Legislature had a rational basis to distinguish between offenders with the same sentence (LWOP) based on their age.
There must be evidence to support the court's decision whether to commit a minor to the Division of Juvenile Justice or a less restrictive option.
A court may not impose liability on a minor’s parents unless authorized by statute.
Attempted robbery is an offense described in Pen. Code §1203.09 and so falls within W&IC §707(b).
The interrogation was coercive and D's rights were violated by the failure to issue Miranda warnings.
W&IC §709(h)(5) does not permit the involuntary confinement of a minor beyond the statutory remediation period for the purpose of arranging post-release services not designed to restore competency.
A TRO application under section W&IC §213.5 must satisfy the procedural requirements of CCP §527; courtroom notice is insufficient.
The Legislature acted within its authority in amending Proposition 57 to restrict the transfer of minors aged 14 and 15 to criminal court until after a transfer hearing.
Prop. 57 and SB 1391, dealing with prosecutors' ability to try 14- and 15-years-old as adults, are retroactive to cases not final upon enactment.
Covid-19 emergency rules do not suspend a minor's right to be physically present in court for proceedings.
W&IC §786(e) does not require a minor's records be sealed when a section 602 petition is dismissed if the minor has been declared a ward of the juvenile court following an adjudication hearing.
A court cannot determine a juvenile’s rehabilitative needs based solely on the gravity of the offense.
Proposition 57 was not retroactive to cases which were final when enacted.
W&IC §775 does not give the juvenile court the authority to reduce or modify an adjudication in the absence of circumstances showing that the original adjudication was somehow flawed.
The juvenile court cannot wield its power under W&I §782 when doing so would deprive a party of the benefit of a plea bargain.
The capacity determination requires a trial ct. to consider the particular circumstances and perspective of the individual child before it, rather than relying on generalizations about what children of a certain age should know.
Probation order that Minor report "all police contacts" was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.
Disposition order that probation department monitor Minor's progress in a treatment program and determine completion did not amount to an improper delegation of authority.
Juvenile court erred by placing minor in an STRTP based on the probation department’s recommendation, which failed to include CFT input.
Court must consider youth-related mitigating factors in deciding whether to impose life without parole under Pen. Code §190.5 (b).
1/1/19 amendment to W&IC §602 did not annul charges adjudicated and wardship determinations which were final on that date; however, it divested court of jurisdiction over any minor who was younger than 12 years of age when law violated.
W&IC §702 requires only an explicit declaration a “wobbler” is being treated as a felony or misdemeanor—it says nothing about an adjudication or a determination or any other deliberative action.
Juvenile court erred in imposing penalties on minor under the Government Code and Vehicle Code because they were inapplicable to a juvenile adjudged a ward of the court.
Defendant was entitled to a transfer hearing because Prop. 57 applies to juveniles tried as adults whose judgments are not final regardless of their current age.
Dept. of Juvenile Justice commitment vacated where minor’s most recent offense was neither listed in PC §290.008(c) nor W&IC §707(b).
Insufficient evidence supported juvenile ct.'s determination that M possessed a concealed firearm and committed vandalism.
A fourth truancy report must be issued to an attendance supervisor or school superintendent in order to establish juvenile ct. jurisdiction.
Electronic search condition struck where it was not reasonably related to minor's future criminality.
While restitution orders in delinquency cases are enforceable as money judgments and can be converted to same, they are not money judgments for the purpose of the CCP §683.020 10-year enforcement limit.
While juvenile ct. may have incorrectly applied Penal Code presumption in finding M's conduct was a substantial factor in causing derivative victims' restitution claim, sufficient evidence supported claim.
Juvenile ct. correctly assigned interest rate of ten percent per year to derivative Vs' restitution award.
Electronic device search condition, while appropriately imposed, had an insufficient relationship to minor's offending conduct; remand necessary.
Where minor fails to file a timely notice of appeal from the dispositional order of the juvenile ct. failing to designate a violation as a felony or a misdemeanor, the Court of Appeal lacks appellate jurisdiction over that order.
Juvenile ct. did not err in issuing a TRO where the prosecutor did not provide the minor to be restrained advance notice of the intention to seek a TRO before the hearing.
Juvenile ct. fitness hearing under Prop. 57 need not be waived personally by minor, counsel may waive.
M's probation condition subjecting all his electronic devices to search was not unconstitutional where M used devices to commit offenses.
A juvenile ct. restitution fine under W&IC §730.6(b)(1) does not have to be stayed pending a hearing on the minor's ability to pay.
Juvenile ct. temporary restraining orders issued against minor improperly without notice, but substantial evidence supported issuance of three-yr. restraining order.
Because a Prop. 57 transfer hearing is not a new trial within the meaning of CCP §170.6(a)(2), the court correctly denied M's motion to disqualify the trial ct. judge.
Restitution order not appealable as there is no final judgment when a minor is placed on informal supervision under W&IC §654.2.
The Truth-in-Evidence provision of the CA Constitution trumped the right to counsel requirements of W&IC §625.6 in determining whether M's confession to police was admissible.
Minor validly waived his Miranda rights where he was informed of them, stated he understood them, and was provided with a "Juvenile Know Your Rights" form by officers.
Minor's statements to officers were not coerced where he was not induced to give a false confession and there was no evidence his will was overborne through aggressive or suggestive tactics.
A juvenile ct. may order a county child welfare agency to provide discovery at no cost to indigent parents of dependent minors in dependency proceedings.
Prop. 57 requires the prosecution to establish a prima facie case of the alleged offense before a minor can be transferred to adult court; nature of alleged offense is relevant to the juvenile ct.'s fitness analysis.
Mother's appeal from dispositional order could not be heard where she failed to file a notice of appeal within 60 days from the date of the order.
SB 1391 is constitutional and consistent with Prop. 57.
Once a minor and ward turns 19 yrs. of age, the juvenile ct. can still order his or her commitment for probation violations.
A person from whom a child has been removed lacks standing to appeal under W&IC §387 unless that person is a relative.
Motion to suppress evidence erroneously denied where officer who conducted patdown search lacked specific and articulable facts to support a reasonable suspicion minor was dangerous.
W&IC §786 providing for automatic sealing of juvenile ct. records does not apply retroactively.
SB 1391 validly protects minors from transfers to criminal ct. because it furthers Prop. 57's objectives.
SB 1391 is unconstitutional insofar as it precludes adult prosecution of an alleged 15-yr.-old murderer.
SB 1391, which prevents the transfer of 14- or 15-yr.-olds from juvenile ct. to criminal ct., is constitutional because it is consistent with and furthers the intent of Prop. 57.
Electronic search condition invalid where it was too broad and therefore unconnected to M's criminality.
Minor's request for informal supervision in place of wardship properly rejected where petition alleged an offense, misdemeanor vehicular manslaughter, which by its nature carried the potential for losses totaling over $1K.
Prosecution did not carry its burden of proving that each act of graffiti by minor amounted to $400 or more in damages so as to constitute felonies.
PC §647(j)(3)(A) criminalizing unauthorized invasion of privacy for use of a concealed camera to secretly record a person in partial undress does not require the recording device to be hidden or surreptitiously placed.
Substantial evidence supported the juvenile ct.’s findings of a probable benefit to minor from a DJJ commitment and the inappropriateness or ineffectiveness of less restrictive alternatives.
Electronics search probation condition was not reasonably related to future criminality and was therefore invalid under Lent.
Minor could be committed to the Department of Juvenile Facilities (DJF) where there was specific information in the record regarding DJF programs that would benefit him.
SB 1391, prohibiting the transfer of 14- and 15-yr.-old offenders to adult criminal court, does not unconstitutionally amend Prop. 57.
SB 1391, prohibiting the transfer of 14- and 15-yr.-old offenders to adult criminal court, does not unconstitutionally amend Prop. 57.
SB 1391, prohibiting the transfer of 14- and 15-yr.-old offenders to adult criminal court, is not an unconstitutional amendment of Prop. 21.
SB 1391 applies retroactively.
Electronic search conditions imposed on minor as part of probation not unconstitutional.
Minor's probation improperly revoked where he did not possess the specific intent that his statements to a family counselor be taken as a threat, and where he did not actually possess a weapon.
Minor's statement that he was going to blow up his school was not protected by the First Amendment, and PC §148.1(c) is not unconstitutionally overbroad.
Senate Bill 1391's bar on the transfer of minors under the age of 16 for criminal prosecution as adults is not unconstitutional under Proposition 57.
Where LWOP sentence of defendant who committed his offense as a minor is final, he may preserve evidence of youth-related factors under PC §1203.01 for his eventual youth offender parole hearing.
A minor who is not charged as an adult is ineligible for a mental health diversion under PC §§1001.35 and 1001.36.
W&IC §366.26 findings and order reversed where subsequent events revealed violation of child's due process rights; case remanded for new hearing.
Finding that M committed burglary reversed where the locker room at a public ice hockey rink was not objectively identifiable as off-limits to the public; finding that M received stolen property affirmed.
Where juvenile ct. sustained a murder allegation on a natural and probable consequences theory, and minor did not petition the court to have the conviction vacated under Pen. Code §1170.95, conviction affirmed.
A juvenile ct.'s Prop. 57 transfer order is appealable under PC §1238(a)(5).
Trial ct. lacked jurisdiction to reconsider its prior order granting minor's writ of habeas corpus for resentencing after its decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeal.
Probation condition allowing search of M's electronic devices held constitutional.
Under W&IC §388, juvenile ct. properly modified disposition to order removal of children even where modification petition requested only detention.
Providing for minor's earlier release if and when he successfully completes a court-ordered treatment program does not impermissibly delegate the length of minor's confinement to the probation officer.
M's convictions in adult criminal ct. to be re-adjudicated in juvenile ct. under Prop. 57 where M's case was not final; differing treatment for M's crimes based on SB 1391 effective 1/1/19.
With a limited remand order pending and the passage of Prop. 57 in the interim, defendant whose conviction and sentence was affirmed on appeal was entitled to a juvenile fitness/transfer hearing under the new law.
Where his case was final, whether D could receive the benefit of Penal Code amendments allowing cts. to strike or dismiss firearm enhancements depended on outcome of his Prop. 57 juvenile ct. transfer hearing.
Sufficient evidence supported the juvenile ct.'s finding that M possessed the malice necessary for second degree murder.
M's Fourth Amendment rights not violated when police spoke with M in her hospital room and obtained consent to search her cell phone.
Officers did not have to administer Miranda advisements to M before she participated in video reenactment because she was not in custody.
M made a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of her Miranda rights before her police interview.
A minor does not qualify for the newly enacted mental health diversion program for defendants with qualifying mental disorders.
M granted deferred entry of judgment may have unfulfilled restitution converted to a civil judgment when his wardship petition is dismissed.
Court did not err in considering M's SSI benefits when calculating restitution amount; remand to also consider M's future earning capacity, current financial circumstances, and the total amount of restitution ordered.
Motion to suppress M's statements to police properly denied where officer told M that he was going to read him his Miranda rights "real quick," but juvenile ct. found advisements were not rushed.
Order committing M to YOTP for seven years or until he turned 21, whichever comes first, was permissible where juvenile ct. retained jurisdiction to determine whether and when M successfully completed the program.
In order for an object to qualify as a deadly weapon based on how it was used, defendant must have used the object in a manner capable of producing and likely to produce death or great bodily injury.
Probation condition requiring M not to post anything related to his offense on social media, and to take down any related current postings, was not unconstitutional.
Convicted defendant entitled to a transfer hearing under Prop. 57 where parties conceded that his case was not yet final on appeal.
D entitled to resentencing where his current sentence, imposed for offenses committed as a minor, was a de facto LWOP sentence that violated the Eighth Amendment under Contreras.
Finding that minor committed burglary reversed in light of Prop. 47; finding that minor received stolen property affirmed.
Transfer order vacated where juvenile ct. did not explicitly state how it weighed each of the five W&IC §707(a)(2) criteria, i.e., which criterion weighed against or in favor of transfer, or was neutral.
Proposition 57 and firearm enhancement contentions could be raised in defendant's appeal without a certificate of probable cause even though defendant entered into an agreed-term plea agreement.
Probation condition prohibiting minor from gaining access to or using any electronic social networking was overbroad and violated the First Amendment.
Although he failed to object in the juvenile ct., minor may challenge on appeal a probation condition prohibiting minor from gaining access to or using any electronic social networking.
Where minor fails to file a timely notice of appeal from the dispositional order of the juvenile ct., the Court of Appeal lacks appellate jurisdiction over that order.
M's LWOP sentence reversed and remanded where record did not show that the trial ct. properly weighed Miller factors.
Because Prop. 57 is retroactive, M entitled to conditional reversal of LWOP sentence and remand to juvenile ct. to determine if it would have transferred M's case from juvenile ct. to adult criminal ct.
Felonious conduct reduced to a misdemeanor by Prop. 47 does not entitle a juvenile offender to removal of his or her DNA samples and profile from state databank.
Prop. 57 applies to any judgment that was not final before the statute took effect.
M's 40-year-to-life sentence is not the functional equivalent of an LWOP sentence and is not in violation of Miller where he will receive a meaningful opportunity for release upon his 25th year of incarceration.
Minor can be ordered to pay restitution for losses beyond those resulting from his or her charged criminal conduct as a condition of probation.
Substantial evidence supported minor's placement at the Division of Juvenile Justice where a series of less restrictive placements failed to rehabilitate him.
Minor's custody credits properly applied by the juvenile ct.
Under W&IC §208.5, a juvenile ct. may transfer to county jail an 18-yr.-old that has not yet been found unsuitable for treatment under the juvenile ct. laws.
A youth offender sentenced to 28 years to life and later found suitable for release under youth offender parole provisions is not required, prior to release, to serve a consecutive sentence for a crime committed in prison after age 25.
PC §3051 supersedes PC §1170.1 with regard to youth offenders who commit in-prison crimes as adults.
Minor's parents not required to reimburse county for legal services provided to minor where no determination was made that parents owed, and juvenile ct. did not order parents to pay a specified sum.
Juvenile ct. properly found M was resisting a police officer in the course of her duties where M was not under investigation or arrest, but was detained by officer for her safety.
Warrantless electronic search condition valid even where minor's past criminal activity did not involve use of electronic devices; condition also not unconstitutional.
A truant M's participation in the School Attendance Review Board process is not a prerequisite to juvenile ct. jurisdiction; four truancy reports confer jurisdiction.
A juvenile offender sentenced to prison and who will be eligible for parole under PC §3051(b) must have the opportunity at sentencing to make a "record of mitigating evidence tied to youth" relevant to the offender's eventual parole hearing.
PC §3051 as applied to D’s 84-yr. sentence satisfied the constitutional mandates of Graham, Miller, and Caballero, affording him a parole hearing well within his life expectancy.
Condition prohibiting M's unsupervised presence on school grounds was unconstitutionally vague as it had no scienter requirement to prohibit M's unauthorized presence on property she knows is school property.