ONCALL
...Family Law
......Attorney Fees
 105 Cards On This Topic:
  • The 2023 version of Fam. Code §6344, which obviates the need for a prevailing petitioner to show inability to afford attorney’s fees and eliminates the requirement to show a disparity in access to funds, applies retroactively.
  • Ps could recover expenses incurred in proving medical records were business records where they proffered sufficient evidence for court to authenticate them at pretrial hearing despite D's denials.
  • Abuse of discretion to deny P's request for equitable relief from untimely service, after multiple attempts and D's actual notice; remedy is remand to consider whether balance of equities supports P's claim.
  • Atty's pervasive incivility considered in determining reasonable fees; court may apply a positive or negative multiplier to adjust the lodestar calculation to account for attorney skill, which includes civility.
  • FC §271 sanctions properly awarded due to H’s continued disregard of court orders, settlement agreement and judgment, and no unreasonable financial burden on him.
  • The party contesting ability to pay sanctions bears the burden of proof on that issue.
  • "Net disposable income" is calculated by deducting permissible statutory deductions from gross income, not living expenses.
  • H's unemployment not a bar to order to pay fees where he had earning capacity.
  • Among the factors justifying the award was H's access to free legal representation.
  • Re CCP §2031.210 document request, statement of compliance need not identify the specific request to which each document will pertain; imposing sanctions was an abuse of discretion after P's substantial compliance.
  • Where all evidence regarding payor's income was disregarded, no evidence supported fee order.
  • Sanctions imposed for filing a frivolous appeal where appeal had no merit, the opposition to SJ being untimely and including no supporting evidence; appeal virtually "dead on arrival."
  • Trial ct. properly awarded D postjudgment collection costs on anti-SLAPP judgment because P did not timely move to tax the costs.
  • Subsequent atty in settlement cases not entitled to vacate first atty's settlement lien against clients where he was not a party to judgment and ct. lacked jurisd. to determine validity of his lien claim or amount of funds to be paid to former clients.
  • Trial ct. did not err in imposing maximum monetary sanctions on Ds for continuous, blatant disregard of discovery and discovery orders.
  • Where client had a judgment confirming his arbitration award in dispute with attorney, client properly found to be the prevailing party under MFAA for purposes of award of attorney fees.
  • Abuse of discretion to order mother pay FC §271 sanctions for litigation behavior that did not, within bounds of reason, merit sanctions.
  • FC §271 permits imposing sanctions only on a party, not a party's attorney.
  • FC §271 sanctions fell within court's authority to redress prior abusive litigation conduct; timing of H’s voluntary dismissal of joinder did not affect its jurisdiction to impose postdismissal sanctions against joined party.
  • Internet troll seeking atty fees failed to establish he prevailed on his motion to quash or that the underlying action arose from his exercise of free speech rights on the Internet.
  • A court violates FC §2030 by not promptly ruling on a request for pendente lite attorney's fees.
  • Deficiencies in W's fee request did not eliminate the court's obligation to provide a reasonably prompt ruling.
  • W's having $21K in savings with which she could pay her own attorneys was not a valid basis to deny her request.
  • Error to deny prevailing anti-SLAPP parties atty fees using lodestar method because court found 3 motions could have been brought as one.
  • Party represented by counsel in atty-client relationship is entitled to an award of fees and costs even if they have been or will be borne by a third party.
  • Where D did not dispute liability or P's right to atty fees and costs, award was proper; although record unclear as to court's reasoning, no abuse of discretion in amount ordered.
  • Under a facially legal retainer agreement pursuant to which some work was performed by an unlicensed attorney, the illegal work did not invalidate the entire agreement, and its arbitration provision was still enforceable.
  • The trial court has authority to impose sanctions under CCP §575.2 for local rule violations, regardless of whether they occurred during pre-trial proceedings or trial proceedings.
  • Courts may impose a monetary sanction for the violation of a local rule on a ground broader than those permitted under CCP §128.5.
  • Appellate argument that is lacking in even potentially persuasive value carries the possibility of sanctions as a frivolous appeal.
  • The party moving for sanctions under CCP §128.5 or CCP §128.7 must wait for the entire 21-day period to expire before filing; failure to comply precludes an award of sanctions.
  • The party moving for sanctions under CCP §128.5 or CCP §128.7 must wait for the entire 21-day period to expire before filing; failure to comply precludes an award of sanctions.
  • Evasive discovery responses frustrate the goal of facilitating settlement by concealing the truth and can result in adverse rulings and attorney’s fees consequences.
  • Failure to show reasonable grounds is a basis to deny a request for attorney’s fees to appeal.
  • Overlitigation of the case is a valid basis for denying any subsequent attorney’s fees.
  • Sanctions appropriate for pursuing a patently frivolous appeal.
  • Rules of Court define “party” to encompass a party’s attorney of record.
  • Sanctions for violating confidentiality of custody evaluations are not subject to procedural requirements of CRC 5.14 and can be requested in a trial brief.
  • Attorney was provided adequate notice sanctions were requested against her by events preceding award.
  • Sanctions for improperly disclosing confidential custody report may be applied to attorneys as well as parties.
  • There is no requirement a party seeking a sanction do so in a separate RFO when the issue can be efficiently and properly handled in conjunction with the original RFO.
  • Personal service not required to impose sanctions on attorney.
  • Code Civ. Proc. §128.7 explained.
  • There is no requirement a party seeking a sanction do so in a separate RFO when the issue can be efficiently and properly handled in conjunction with the original RFO.
  • Calculating the time for service of a CCP §128.7 motion.
  • If the objectionable document is resolved by the court during the safe harbor period, CCP §128.7 sanctions cannot be awarded.
  • How to handle CCP §128.7's safe harbor if there is insufficient time to give 21 days' notice.
  • CC §1717 sanctions after appeal are only available if they were originally awarded by trial court.
  • A defendant who tenders payment of a default judgment is in the same position as a defendant who makes a pre-complaint tender of payment of a contractual debt.
  • Detailed time records are not required; trial courts have discretion to award fees based on declarations of counsel describing the work they have done.
  • Costs for demonstratives and photocopies of exhibits prepared for, but ultimately not used at, trial are recoverable in the trial court’s discretion.
  • RFA costs of proof properly awarded where Ps did not have a good faith belief they would prevail on their claims arising out of the alleged oral contract.
  • CCP §128.7 sanctions should not be routinely or easily awarded, and the evidentiary burden to escape them is light.
  • Matters are “related to” the UPA for Fam. Code §7605 fees if they involve custody, visitation, support and restraining orders.
  • An award of fees appropriate in custody action, even if requesting parent has committed domestic violence.
  • Fee order reversed where party’s litigation strategy was unnecessary and objectively unreasonable.
  • Rules requiring contingency fee contracts to be in writing apply to in-house counsel.
  • When the amount of the recovery is miniscule in comparison to the demand, the trial judge has discretion to decide the “victory” is pyrrhic and nobody won.
  • A prima facie case as to the costs incurred and their reasonableness can be established by the plaintiff’s testimony that bills for the services were paid.
  • Declarations requesting awards of attorney's fees should contain enough specifics for court to be able to evaluate nature of services.
  • Under the lodestar method, a trial court is not limited to the hourly rate actually charged by the attorney.
  • While the client’s file is the property of the client, the obligation to turn it over is activated by a request, either from the client himself or from the client’s new counsel.
  • Sanctions appropriate where Ds failed to admit RFAs by answering they lacked sufficient information to admit or deny; motion to compel not required.
  • Arguments against a lodestar award and enhancement rejected.
  • A spouse does not need to show bad faith of trustee to get an award of attorney's fees against a spendthrift trust.
  • Third parties may be ordered to pay reasonable fees related to that party; the requesting spouse need not show a likelihood of success—only that the request is not specious.
  • The ALJ improperly rejected A's evidence as to what his reasonable hourly rate should be.
  • The burden of proof governing fee motions.
  • Survey data used to determine paralegal's fees must be based on the relevant community, not a large geographical area.
  • When sanctions were based on misrepresentations, they may be reconsidered after the case is dismissed.
  • When an attorney sues for breach of a fee agreement, the amount recoverable must be determined under the terms of the fee agreement, even if the agreed upon fee exceeds a reasonable fee.
  • Courts properly consider whether the attorney seeking fees has become personally embroiled, has over-litigated, or whether incivility has affected the litigation costs.
  • No abuse of discretion to award fees commensurate with recovery; a rational investor will not spend more than $1 to recover $1.
  • Requests for attorney fees on appeal should be made in the trial court.
  • A judgment that includes an award of “reasonable attorney fees” but not an award of a specified amount is an “award” of fees under CCP §685.040.
  • Suits "on a contract" for purposes of prevailing party attorney fee clauses are construed liberally and extend to any action that involves a contract.
  • Sanctions for denying RFAs proper where party fails to show they could reasonably believe they would prevail at trial.
  • A self-represented attorney litigant may not recover attorney fees in the nature of sanctions under section 271.
  • Plaintiff's failure to request attorneys fees when taking a default does not bar a subsequent award for post-judgment fees to defend against defendant's attempts to set the judgment aside.
  • Privileged information contained in billing invoices submitted in support of an attorney's fees claim may be redacted.
  • There is no legal requirement to present billing statements to obtain an award of attorney's fees.
  • The court may not consider the parties' settlement offers in determining the prevailing party.
  • Parties may not vary the criteria for who is the prevailing party in their contract.
  • When D admits it owes part of the claim, to be the prevailing party it must admit its debt and tender that amount before a contested trial.
  • Plaintiff does not have to prevail on all claims to be the prevailing party.
  • Sanctions for frivolous appeal proper where it was objectively and subjectively frivolous because it was devoid of factual or legal support.
  • The amount of sanctions determined by fees on appeal, the degree of objective frivolousness and delay, and the need to discourage similar conduct in the future.
  • Code Civ. Proc. §2023.030 (a) limits the court's discretion to decline to award monetary sanctions for violation of discovery rules.
  • Discovery sanctions may not be imposed as a punishment.
  • For attorneys to be liable for monetary discovery sanctions, they must have advised the client to engage in that conduct.
  • No award for attorney’s fees under CCP 1218 (a) unless conduct involves violating a court order.
  • CCP §128.5’s 21-day safe harbor provision does not work in an anti-SLAPP action, so it is proper to request attorney’s fees in the responsive declaration.
  • While a trial court may not award CCP §128.7 sanctions for conduct occurring before an arbitrator, it can award sanctions for a party’s efforts to thwart arbitration.
  • Although the appeal was without merit and caused a “useless diversion of this court’s attention," sanctions were not imposed because of the demanding requirements imposed by Flaherty.
  • Attorney properly sanctioned for misleading the court by lack of candor.
  • Although the prevailing party is entitled to an award for necessary costs, the losing party must have a fair opportunity to contest the request and show it to be unreasonable or "clearly inappropriate."
  • Although Hague Convention no longer applies to a child after they reach 16, court may still make a prevailing party fee order so long as return order issued before that date.
  • The prevailing petitioner is presumptively entitled to necessary costs and the statute shifts the burden of proof onto a losing respondent to show why an award of necessary expenses would be "clearly inappropriate."
  • The principles that govern an award of attorney's fees for discovery abuses are compulsion, causation, and reasonableness.
  • Attorneys may only be sanctioned for advising disobedience to a court's discovery order, not merely contributing to disobedience or failing to diligently pursue requested documents.
  • Attorney fees awarded pursuant to statute (exceeding fees already paid) belong, absent an enforceable agreement to the contrary, to the attorneys who labored to earn them.
  • The MFAA does not apply in a dispute where the fee or costs to be paid by the client or on his or her behalf has been determined pursuant to statute or court order.
  • Proper to use out-of-town counsel's customary hourly rate rather than reasonable hourly rate prevailing in the community when a reasonable showing is made that hiring local counsel was impractical.
  • The financial need of the party seeking sanctions is irrelevant to a section 271 request.
  • Trial ct.'s decision to not tax defendant's costs for trial exhibit photocopies, binders, demonstratives, deposition travel costs, and interpreter fees upheld.


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